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WHEN STRONG ENFORCEMENT WORKS BETTER THAN
WEAK REGULATION: THE EPA/DOJ NEW SOURCE REVIEW
ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE
THOMAS O. MCGARITY ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Every regulatory program encounters regulatees who are
determined to do as little as possible to comply with regulatory
requirements imposed by the applicable statute or, more typically, by
regulations promulgated by the implementing agency.
When
Congress or the regulatory agency uses ambiguous language to
establish regulatory requirements or imposes those requirements in
highly complex ways, regulatees can interpret critical words or employ
complexity to their advantage. In characterizing how regulatees
comply with regulatory requirements, Professors Hickman and Hill
1
divide them into three categories. “Maximal compliers” are risk
averse with respect to being prosecuted for violating regulations for
various reasons, including reputational considerations, a perceived
alignment of interest with the regulators, or a preference for stability
2
“Flouters” have little regard for regulatory
over uncertainty.
requirements, most of which they believe to be illegitimate, and they
are inclined to pursue their economic interests without regard to
3
those requirements. Even when the language of the statute or
regulation is precise and the regulatory regime lacks complexity,
flouters are willing to engage in what they know to be unlawful
conduct if the risk of being prosecuted multiplied by the magnitude
4
of the resulting punishment is sufficiently low.
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1. Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1159–65 (2010).
2. Id. at 1161.
3. Id. at 1160–61.
4. Id.
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The vast majority of regulatees are in the third category of
5
“minimal compliers” who “operate in the gray areas of the law.”
Determined to do no more than is minimally necessary to comply
with regulatory requirements, aggressive minimal compliers search
for ambiguity in the language of the regulatory requirements and
exploit complexity to their maximum advantage. They “engage
reputable lawyers to help them calculate their compliance with great
care, discerning in advance the gray areas of statutory and regulatory
6
text and planning their behavior to conform colorably to the law.”
Other minimal compliers are less inclined to press the envelope of
compliance, but will follow the more aggressive minimal compliers in
adopting the least costly strategies that arguably comply with the
7
regulatory requirements.
Environmental law scholars have recognized two broad
approaches to environmental enforcement—deterrence-based
8
compliance assurance and assistance-based compliance assurance.
The former approach provides negative incentives to discourage
noncompliance; the latter provides positive incentives to encourage
9
compliance. The former emphasizes the “stick” of noncompliance
penalties; the latter emphasizes the “carrot” of compliance
10
incentives. Advocates of strong environmental regulation prefer the
11
first theory; the regulated industries vastly prefer the latter theory.
This Article will apply the distinction between deterrence and
assistance more broadly to posit two broad approaches to regulatory
implementation in mature regulatory environments where the
underlying statutes remain static and complexity increases over time.
The deterrence-based approach to regulation assumes that most
12
regulatees are either flouters or aggressive minimal compliers.
5. Id. at 1162.
6. Id. at 1163. Hickman and Hill cite aggressive tax shelter participants as an example. Id.
7. Id. at 1163–64.
8. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the
Future of Environmental Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 10803, 10803
(2000); Ronald H. Rosenberg, Doing More or Doing Less for the Environment: Shedding Light on
EPA’s Stealth Method of Environmental Enforcement, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 175, 182
(2008); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, at 2-1 to 2-7
(1992) [hereinafter EPA, PRINCIPLES].
9. Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,803–04.
10. Id.
11. David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented”
State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–
4 (2000).
12. Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,803–04.
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Stringent regulations in a deterrence-based regime grow more
complex as agency enforcers prosecute flouters, minimal compliers
interpret their way around regulations, the agency rewrites the rules
to eliminate loopholes, and the process begins all over again as the
agency strictly enforces the amended rules. The assistance-based
approach assumes that most regulatees are maximal compliers and
can be trusted to err on the side of compliance in interpreting
13
Regulatees only need
ambiguous regulatory language.
encouragement and occasional assistance in negotiating complex
regulatory regimes either by way of guidance with respect to existing
regulations or by way of amending the regulations to make them
clearer, less complex, or, to the extent that they are unnecessarily
burdensome, less stringent.
A good example of a mature regulatory regime is the regulatory
program that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has
created and maintained under the Clean Air Act. From EPA’s
inception, it has encountered regulatees in all three categories. Not
infrequently, the language of the statute and implementing
regulations is subject to varying interpretations, sometimes because
the agency wants to retain discretion to address issues on a case-by14
case basis. And the program is constantly evolving as its politically
appointed leadership migrates from strict deterrence to helpful
assistance, reflecting the broad policy preferences of different
15
As the program has evolved, it has
presidential administrations.
invariably grown more complex, and minimal compliers and flouters
have exploited that complexity and the ambiguity in regulatory
language to avoid installing expensive pollution reduction
technologies.
This Article will examine the dynamic between deterrence-based
and assistance-based implementation in the context of the major
enforcement initiative that EPA and the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) undertook in the late-1990s to address what they believed to
be widespread noncompliance with the Clean Air Act’s new source
13. Id. at 10,804.
14. See, e.g., S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. EPA, 472 F.3d 882, 894–95 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (describing EPA’s failed attempt to interpret the Clean Air Act in a manner maximizing its own discretion); see also Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 176 (observing that “EPA has
translated . . . diverse statutory directives into a sweeping and complex set of environmental rules affecting a variety of activities undertaken by both private firms and by individuals”).
15. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,804 (noting that “in actual practice, EPA’s
enforcement has been closer to a hybrid of deterrence and cooperation,” and that changes
in administrations affect which model dominates).
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review (“NSR”) requirements. The effort ultimately covered many
industries, but the industry that offered the largest payoff was the
electric power industry. The Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) has characterized the power plant initiative as “perhaps the
most comprehensive and coordinated enforcement effort under the
16
Clean Air Act to date.” Focusing on fossil-fuel-fired power plants,
this Article will describe the interaction between the aggressive
enforcers in EPA and DOJ who were dedicated to aggressive
deterrence-based enforcement of what they believed to be fairly
unambiguous regulations and EPA’s politically appointed leaders
who, during the George W. Bush administration, were such strong
advocates of assistance-based implementation that they were willing to
amend the underlying rules to legalize previously unlawful activities.
It will follow the enforcement initiative through the ups and downs of
the Bush administration as the agency leaders vigorously pursued
rulemaking initiatives that would clarify the relevant requirements,
but would also render them less environmentally protective. And it
will describe the reinvigorated enforcement initiative during the
Obama administration as agency leaders with a different policy
orientation backed the enforcement office’s aggressive deterrencebased approach.
Three aspects of this experience are relevant to the broader
question of how agency leaders should go about choosing between
deterrence and assistance in implementing regulatory programs.
First, it offers an example of what can be accomplished when a
regulatory agency and DOJ are willing to devote substantial resources
to a coordinated deterrence-based enforcement initiative. In short,
the NSR enforcement story demonstrates that deterrence-based
enforcement vigorously pursued can yield huge public benefits.
Second, it offers a cautionary note that successful deterrence-based
enforcement efforts take years, even decades, to reach fruition and
can entail very large resource commitments. Yet, in the final analysis,
a carefully selected enforcement initiative may accomplish more than
a major assistance-based rulemaking initiative. Finally, the NSR
enforcement experience teaches that, once begun, a serious
deterrence-based enforcement initiative is difficult to stop when
changes in administrations result in leaders who are committed to an
assistance-based approach to regulation.

16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 12-590, AIR POLLUTION: EPA NEEDS
BETTER INFORMATION ON NEW SOURCE REVIEW PERMITS 21 (2012) [hereinafter GAO,
BETTER INFORMATION].
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II. THE NSR PROGRAM
A. The Origins of NSR
New source review has its origins in the 1970 amendments to the
Clean Air Act, the statute that created the basic structure of the
modern Clean Air Act. Under that statute, EPA had to promulgate
and periodically revise national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards for pollutants that endangered public health or
welfare and were emitted by numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
17
The statute gave the states an initial opportunity to
sources.
promulgate state implementations plans (“SIPs”) capable of ensuring
that the primary standards were attained by prescribed statutory
18
deadlines. Thus, EPA established the air quality goals for the nation,
and the states imposed source-specific requirements, often in the
form of technology-based standards, that were capable of reducing
emissions of the relevant pollutants to the extent necessary to ensure
that the nation’s air attained those goals.
One important exception to this institutional arrangement was
the requirement in section 111 that EPA promulgate “new source
performance standards” (“NSPS”) for listed categories of stationary
sources reflecting the best adequately demonstrated control
19
These technology-based standards were
technologies (“BADT”).
automatically incorporated into SIPs and were binding on any
company that proposed to construct a new source (sometimes
referred to as a “greenfield source”) within the relevant category or
20
attempted to modify an existing source in that category. The statute
defined the critical term “modification” to mean “any physical change
in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which
21
increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source.”
This brief definition and EPA’s various elaborations upon its meaning
provide the substantive underpinning for the DOJ/EPA, NSR
enforcement initiative.

17. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2006).
18. Id. § 7410(a)(1). The statute recognizes the possibility of an extension for another five years. Id. § 7502(a)(2).
19. Id. § 7411(a)(1), (d). The term “stationary source” was defined to be “any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” Id.
§ 7411(a)(3).
20. See id. § 7411(a)(2) (defining “new source”).
21. Id. § 7411(a)(4). Existing sources in categories for which EPA had not promulgated an NSPS were free to undertake any physical or operational changes so long as they
did not violate the requirements of the relevant SIPs. Id. at § 7411(d).
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Insofar as the federal technology-based requirements were
concerned, the 1970 statute effectively “grandfathered” existing
22
sources. They were subject to any technology-based requirements
that the states imposed in their SIPS, but they were only subject to the
federal NSPS if they were modified within the meaning of the
23
Congress apparently understood that industrial
regulations.
24
facilities were not designed to last forever. As companies gradually
replaced units with new plants outfitted with modern pollution
controls capable of meeting the NSPS, emissions would automatically
decrease. Since it was presumably much less costly to design pollution
control into a new plant than to retrofit it into an existing plant,
Congress may have deemed it more efficient to leave existing sources
to state regulation so long as they were not modified in ways that
25
increased emissions.
The NSPS for coal-fired electric power plants has been, far and
away, the most controversial standard in this program for at least
three reasons. First, electric power plays a vital role in the U.S.
26
economy and in the comfort and convenience of its citizens.
Second, coal has traditionally fired the majority of power plants in the
27
Third, coal-fired power plants are among the largest
country.
stationary-source emitters of sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and

22. Jonathan R. Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1678 (2007).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1681–82 (“[T]he legislative history of the Clear Air Act’s . . . amendments
strongly suggests that Congress in 1970 expected grandfathering of these sources to be
only temporary.”); David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 195 (2005) (“Congress may have intended that this provision operate gradually to widen the scope of coverage of the new source permitting provisions as old plants were replaced or modified, so that over time the number of exempted
plants would dwindle to zero.”); BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL.
COMM’RS, GRANDFATHERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPARABILITY: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF AIR EMISSION REGULATIONS AND ELECTRICITY MARKET DISTORTIONS 11–12
(1998) (citing interviews with participants in the drafting process).
25. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET A-2001-19, NSR 90-DAY REVIEW BACKGROUND
PAPER 2 (2001) [hereinafter NSR BACKGROUND PAPER] (“Congress believed incorporating
pollution controls into the design and construction when new units are built or when old
ones are modified significantly is generally the most efficient way of controlling pollution
from major sources.”).
26. See DANIEL YERGIN: THE QUEST (2011) (“Electricity underpins modern civilization.”).
27. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1981); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A
MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD
BE DONE ABOUT IT 1–2 (1981).
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28

oxides of nitrogen, three of the criteria pollutants that have always
been the central focus of the Clean Air Act’s regulatory regime. All
three of these pollutants are major contributors to respiratory disease;
two of them (sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen) damage nearby
crops and natural vegetation and are transported long distances by
the wind and contribute to acid rain; two of them (sulfur dioxide in
the form of sulfates and particulate matter) damage visibility in
pristine areas; and one of them (particulate matter) is strongly
29
associated with increased human mortality. Coal-fired power plants
are also major emitters of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas pollutant
30
that EPA had not attempted to regulate until recently. Finally, even
minor differences among options for reducing pollutant emission
rates for power plants can have major impacts on human health and
31
the environment over the plants’ forty-year life expectancy.
B. Defining “Modification”
At first glance, the definition of “modification” in the statute 32
seems straightforward enough. Strictly construed, any physical or
operational change, no matter how trivial or tangential to the source’s
primary functions, that increased the amount of any air pollutant
emitted from the relevant source would give rise to an obligation to
33
retrofit technology capable of meeting the NSPS for that source. It
soon became apparent to the agency, however, that this
straightforward definition needed further elaboration. The agency
concluded that Congress did not intend to include “mundane
activities” like “the repair or replacement of a single leaky pipe, or a
34
change in the way that pipe is utilized.” A strict interpretation of the
28. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 313; ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 27, at 129.
29. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 313; Richard E. Ayres & David D. Doniger, New Source
Standard for Power Plants II: Consider the Law, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 74 (1979); William
C. Banks, EPA Bends to Industry Pressures on Coal NSPS—and Breaks, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 67, 76–
79 (1980).
30. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (upholding EPA’s authority to regulate carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act); see also Clean Air Act and Increased Coal Use:
Environmental Protection Agency Oversight, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Env’t, Energy, and
Natural Res., 96th Cong. 301–02 (1979) (statement of Alan T. Crane & Steven E. Plotkin,
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress) (acknowledging, presciently, the link
between carbon dioxide emissions, coal plants, and global warming and foreshadowing the
coming debate).
31. Ayres & Doniger, supra note 29, at 75.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2006).
33. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1681.
34. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans;
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New
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definition could also include every maintenance or repair project
necessary to keep a plant running safely and efficiently if it also
increased the amount of emissions over the amount immediately
preceding the project.
The word “modification” was sufficiently vague, the regulators in
EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation (“OAR”) reasoned, that the agency
could promulgate a regulation interpreting that word to avoid
prosecuting companies that engaged in routine projects designed
merely to keep the facility running smoothly. In 1971, EPA
promulgated a regulation defining “modification” to exclude routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement; an increase in production
rate, if the increase did not exceed the operating design capacity of
the affected facility; an increase in hours of operation; and use of
alternative fuel or raw material if the affected facility could
35
accommodate such use.
Having assisted the industry by addressing ambiguous statutory
language with a clarifying regulation, EPA’s first administrator,
William Ruckelshaus, adopted a vigorous deterrence-based approach
36
to enforcing the regulations promulgated under the new statute.
Ruckelshaus later related that “it was important for us . . . to actually
show we were willing to take on the large institutions in the society
37
which hadn’t been paying much attention to the environment.” The
agency realized that it lacked the manpower to file many lawsuits and
pursue them to completion, but it was determined to send a message
38
to flouters and minimal compliers that it meant business. The EPA
and the states decided on a case-by-case basis in individual
enforcement actions whether particular projects came within the
routine maintenance, repair and replacement (“RMRR”) exclusion
based on several factors, including the nature, extent, purpose,
39
frequency, and cost of proposed activities.

Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314, 32,316 (July 21, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Implementation Plan Rules].
35. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876, 24,877
(Dec. 23, 1971).
36. Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Interdisciplinary Aspects of Environment Enforcement, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 10,495, 10,499–500 (2006).
37. William D. Ruckelshaus: Oral History Interview, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/publications/print/ruck.html (last updated Dec.
10, 2012).
38. Richard S. Frank, Environment Report/EPA and Justice Department Clash over Antipollution Enforcement, NAT’L J., Oct. 9, 1971, at 2048.
39. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 1990); Nash & Revesz,
supra note 22, at 1678, 1684–85; GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 13.
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The agency promulgated another assistance-based regulation in
1975 to address confusion that had arisen among regulatees
concerning the kinds of changes that would and would not subject
sources to the NSPS. Among other things, the new regulation
clarified that a modification to an “affected facility” within an existing
source subjected only that facility, and not the entire source, to the
40
NSPS if EPA had promulgated an NSPS for that facility. Another
change, referred to as “netting,” allowed a source to avoid the NSPS
for individual units within the source if the net emissions from all
41
A “net emissions
units affected by the project did not increase.
increase” was defined to be the increase in “emissions from a
particular physical or change in the method of operation” together
with any other “contemporaneous” increases or decreases in actual
emissions from the other affected units, where “contemporaneous”
was defined to include any increases or decreases within the previous
42
five years.
The 1975 regulation defined the critical term “increase” to mean
an increase in the number of kilograms of pollutant emitted per
43
hour. It also added to the list of exemptions: (1) an increase in a
facility’s “production rate” if that increase could “be accomplished
without a capital expenditure on that facility,” and (2) the addition or
use of any system or device the “primary function” of which was to
reduce air pollution, except for removing an emission control system
or replacing one with a system that the Administrator deemed to be
44
“less environmentally beneficial.” Finally, the 1975 rule stated that
the NSPS applied to existing facilities that underwent
“reconstruction,” regardless of whether it resulted in an increase in
emissions, if the fixed capital cost of the reconstruction exceeded fifty
percent of the fixed capital cost needed to construct a comparable
facility and if complying with the NSPS was economically and
45
technologically feasible.
The agency’s emphasis on deterrence-based enforcement
continued throughout the Carter presidency under Administrator

40. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1685.
41. Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3282, 3282 (Jan. 16, 1979);
Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1687.
42. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(3) (2012); Notice of Availability; Alternatives for New Source
Review (“NSR”) Applicability for Major Modifications; Solicitation of Comment, 63 Fed.
Reg. 39,857, 39,857 n.1 (July 24, 1998) [hereinafter Notice of Availability].
43. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1686.
44. 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(2), (5) (2012).
45. Id. § 60.15(b).
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46

Douglas Costle.
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement Marvin
Durning initiated a “file first/negotiate later” policy under which
regional offices were required to refer all major violations directly to
47
EPA headquarters before negotiating with violators. Having seized
greater control over agency enforcement efforts, Durning aggressively
exercised the new powers that the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air
Act provided to the agency, which included a strong noncompliance
48
penalty.
C. The 1977 CAA Amendments
The 1977 amendments to the Clean Act 49 addressed two issues
that Congress had not anticipated in 1970. First, EPA was struggling
with how to address the many “nonattainment” areas that had not met
50
Second, the agency had to
the NAAQS by the 1977 deadline.
address a judicially imposed requirement to prevent significant
deterioration of air quality in “clean air” areas of the country where
51
the air currently met the national ambient air quality standards. The
1977 amendments addressed both problems by establishing permit
requirements for new sources and modifications of existing sources
52
that had the potential to emit large quantities of pollutants. The
term that practitioners used to describe the process of determining
whether new facilities or modifications of existing facilities qualified
53
for the permit requirement was NSR.
Before a company could obtain a permit for erecting a new
major stationary source or undertaking a major modification of an
existing major source in a nonattainment area, it had to meet a
number of statutory requirements, including installing technology
46. Mintz, supra note 36, at 10,500.
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (2006).
49. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977).
50. Envtl. Law Inst., History—The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 2 L. OF ENVTL.
PROT. § 12:90 (2012).
51. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated as moot in light of
1977 amendments, W. Energy Supply and Transmission Assocs. v. EPA, 434 U.S. 809 (1977).
52. A state had the option of drafting its own NSR program and seeking EPA approval
of that program or requesting that EPA delegate the program that EPA had promulgated
in its regulations. NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 2.
53. New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Makram B. Jaber, Utility Settlements in New Source Review Lawsuits, 18 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 22, 22 (2004) (discussing
the enforcement actions brought by the EPA against electric utility companies for alleged
violations of the Clean Air Act’s NSR); NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 2 (“The
purpose of the [NSR] program is to protect public health and welfare, as well as national
parks and wilderness areas, even as new sources are built and existing sources expand.”).
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capable of meeting the “lowest achievable emissions rate” (“LAER”).
To obtain a permit in an area that was not in a nonattainment area,
sometimes called a “prevention of significant deterioration” (“PSD”)
area, a company had to install the “best available control technology”
(“BACT”), as determined by the permitting agency on a case-by-case
55
basis. For purposes of the nonattainment permit program, the term
“major stationary source” was defined to include any source with the
56
For
potential to emit 100 tons per year of any air pollutant.
purposes of the PSD permit program, the term “major emitting
facility” was defined to include any source on a list of twenty-eight
specified categories that had the potential to emit 100 tons per year
(“tpy”) of any air pollutant and any other source with the potential to
57
emit 250 tpy.
For both programs, the statute defined “modification” to have
58
Thus, Congress
the same meaning as in the NSPS program.
continued to grandfather existing sources from these more heavily
regulated programs so long as they did not undertake a
59
modification. Since the 100 tpy and 250 tpy thresholds applied to
the emissions from the existing source, however, it was unclear
whether every physical or operational change that resulted in a very
minor increase in emissions from such a large source would subject
the entire source to the rigorous NSR requirements or whether EPA
could by rule establish separate de minimis thresholds, called
“significance levels” for such modifications. The EPA addressed this
issue in its implementing regulations for the PSD program by
defining “modification” to mean “a physical or operational change
that increased a source’s ‘potential to emit’ pollutants, defining that
term to mean a source’s potential to emit pollutants without any

54. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(B)(2) (2006).
55. Id. § 7475(a)(4). Neither LAER nor BACT could be less stringent than any applicable new source performance standard. LARRY B. PARKER & JOHN E. BLODGETT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30432, AIR QUALITY AND ELECTRICITY: ENFORCING NEW SOURCE
REVIEW 19–20 (2000).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2006).
57. Id. § 7479(1).
58. See id. § 7479(2)(C) (defining “construction” for the PSD program as including
“the modification (as defined in section 7411 . . .) of any source or facility”); id. § 7501(4)
(defining modification for the nonattainment program as meaning “the same as the term
“modification is used in section 7411”); see also 1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra
note 34, at 32,315 (“The 1970 CAA required EPA to promulgate technology-based NSPS
applicable to the construction or modification of stationary sources that cause or contribute significantly to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.” (citation omitted)).
59. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1684–85.
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pollution controls in place, and limiting NSR to “major”
modifications that resulted in increased emissions of 100 or 250 tpy,
60
depending on the category.
At the same time that Congress provided for NSR, it empowered
ordinary citizens to insist that modified sources comply with the
process by creating a procedure for citizen enforcement of those
provisions. Section 304 of the Clean Air Act provides that “any person
may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against any
person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or modified
61
major emitting facility without a permit.” At least sixty days prior to
commencing a citizen enforcement action, the citizen must give
notice of the violation to EPA, to the state in which the violation took
62
place, and to the violator. If EPA or the state, within the sixty days,
intervenes and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in court, then
the citizen enforcement action may not proceed, but the citizen may
remain a party to the governmental enforcement action with full
63
participatory rights.
D. The Alabama Power Litigation
Industry and environmental groups challenged the agency’s PSD
implementation regulations, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in late 1979 rendered a decision
64
that sent EPA back to the drawing board on the NSR provisions.
First, the court held that “potential to emit” meant the potential of a
source to emit pollutants with all of the pollution control
65
technologies in place. This had the effect of dramatically reducing
the number of new and existing facilities that came within the
definition of “major emitting facility” and were therefore subject to
66
NSR. Second, it held that EPA exceeded its statutory authority in
excluding from the definition of modification all physical and
operational changes that resulted in emissions of fewer than 100 and
67
Although EPA had inherent discretion to promulgate
250 tpy.

60. Id. at 1687 (quoting Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans:
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments to Prevent Significant Deterioration, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388,
26,403 (June 19, 1978)).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (2006).
62. Id. § 7604(b)(1)(A).
63. Id. § 7604(b)(1)(B).
64. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
65. Id. at 353.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 399–400.
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regulations defining de minimis emissions thresholds for changes that
would not come within the meaning of the word “modification,” it
could not merely incorporate the same thresholds that the statute
specified for determining whether new construction activities were
68
Otherwise, the court explained, grandfathered
subject to NSR.
sources would gain a perpetual immunity from federal technologybased requirements, despite a clear congressional intent to give
69
existing stationary sources only a temporary reprieve.
E. The Post-Alabama Power Regulations (1980)
EPA responded to the court’s remand in 1980 with a new set of
regulations that, among other things, applied the statutory
“majorness” thresholds (100/250 tpy) to new and existing sources and
created separate significance levels for modifications of existing major
sources. The new significance levels effectively exempted from the
statute’s NSR requirements any physical or operational change in a
relevant unit that resulted in an emissions increase of fewer than forty
tpy of sulfur dioxide (“SO2) or nitrogen oxides (“NOx”) in PSD areas
and changes that resulted in an increase of fewer than 10–100 tpy in
nonattainment areas, depending on the severity of the
70
nonattainment. Like the NSPS regulations, the NSR regulations also
exempted RMRR projects and increases in hours or production rates,
and they allowed sources to offset emissions increases in the changed
unit with decreases from other affected units within a single source in
71
determining whether there would be a net emissions increase.
Although these provisions turned out to be highly contestable in
subsequent litigation, they received very little attention from either
72
the agency or the interested parties during the 1980 rulemaking. In
one significant departure from the 1975 NSPS regulations, the NSR
regulations measured increases in tons per year, rather than
kilograms per hour, to be consistent with the tons per year approach
that Congress had used in defining the statutory “majorness”

68. Id.
69. Id. at 400.
70. See NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 3; (noting the 10–100 tpy major
source threshold range for nonattainment NSR); PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 7
(noting that NSR is triggered when a modification will cause a forty-tpy increase in oxides
of sulfur and nitrogen).
71. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1688–89; NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25,
at 4. The NSR definition of modification tracked the PSD definition. Id.
72. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1689.
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73

thresholds.
As we shall see, this distinction between annual
emissions and hourly emissions was fiercely debated in the subsequent
NSR enforcement litigation, and the issue ultimately had to be
74
resolved by the Supreme Court.
F. Avoiding NSR During the Reagan Administration
As President Reagan entered office in early 1981, the operators
of existing sources were just becoming familiar with the two-step NSR
75
First, the operator of an existing major source had to
process.
determine whether the project would result in a physical or
76
operational change. If the project fell within one of the specified
exemptions, such as the RMRR or increased hours of operation
exemptions, then it did not constitute a physical or operational
77
change and was therefore not subject to NSR. If the project did
involve a physical or operational change, the operator had to
determine whether emissions attributable to the project would exceed
78
the significance level. In making that determination, the operator
had to subtract the baseline level of emissions (the level of emissions
from the source just prior to the anticipated project) from the
potential emissions from the source after the project’s completion,
summing contemporaneous increases and decreases of emissions
from the project and other units within the source that were affected
79
80
by the project. If so, the project had to undergo NSR. Both steps
often involved complex determinations based on multiple factors and
imprecise regulatory language, all of which created ample gray areas
81
for minimal compliers to exploit.

73. 1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34, at 32,316; PARKER & BLODGETT,
supra note 55, at 7.
74. Envtl. Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
75. See New Source Review Policy, Regulations and Enforcement Activities, Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. 606
(2002) [hereinafter Senate NSR Policy Hearings] (statement of John Walke, Clean Air Director, Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”)) (testifying about the history of NSR
enforcement).
76. 1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34, at 32,316; GAO, BETTER
INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 13.
77. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 13.
78. 1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34, at 32,316.
79. Alternatives for New Source Review (NSR) Applicability for Major Modifications,
63 Fed. Reg. 39,857, 39,857–58 n.l (July 24, 1998).
80. Id. at 39,857.
81. See GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 13 (discussing the complexity of
the determinations).
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The operators of fossil-fuel-fired power plants had strong
82
incentives to avoid NSR. Electricity deregulation was just getting
underway, and utility companies could no longer live the comfortable
life of a regulated monopoly in which they could pass through to their
83
customers any expenditures incurred in installing pollution controls.
In addition, many companies were relying on power plants that were
nearing or past the end of their planned lifetimes, and they were
contemplating the possibility of replacing them with nuclear power
84
plants. When the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility
rendered that option considerably less attractive, they were left with
85
coal as the only realistically available fuel. But building new coal
plants would be very expensive because of EPA’s recently tightened
86
NSPS for fossil-fuel-fired steam electric plants and because states
87
were not always expeditious in granting the necessary permits.
88
Refurbishing the old plants was a much less expensive option.
The Reagan administration adopted a friendly assistance-based
89
approach to implementation. Administrator Ann Gorsuch was not
disposed to file enforcement actions against companies that had not
complied with the complex and, to many companies, unfamiliar NSR
90
requirements. In her view, the goal should be to encourage future

82. See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 274, 283
(W.D. Pa. 2011) (acknowledging that “power plant operators have an obvious incentive to
make a ‘reasonable’ prediction that the stricter emissions standards will not be implicated”).
83. See Spence, supra note 24, at 203 n.85 (citing legal scholarship).
84. Clearing the Air: An Oversight Hearing on the Administration’s Clean Enforcement Program, Hearing Before the S. Dem. Pol. Comm. 2 (2004) (statement of Bruce Buckheit, former
enforcement chief, EPA) [hereinafter Buckheit Testimony].
85. Id.
86. See Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 114 (responses of Jeffrey
Holmstead, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA) (stating that it cost one
California facility $100,000 per ton of nitrogen oxide to meet the NSR standard); LARRY B.
PARKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 85–50 ENR, THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND PROPOSED
ACID RAIN LEGISLATION: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? 46 (1985) (“With new powerplants costing over $1000 a Kilowatt to construct, utilities have powerful incentives to avoid
construction and to rehabilitate older facilities instead.”).
87. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 114 (responses of Jeffrey Holmstead,
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA).
88. Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84, at 2.
89. William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the Clean Water
Act, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 72 (2007).
90. JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE STORY OF THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 46 (1984); Senate NSR Policy Hearings,
supra note 75, at 606 (statement of John Walke, NRDC); Elizabeth Shogren, Decision Near
on Air Rule Review, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at A2 [hereinafter Shogren, Decision Near].
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91

compliance, not punish past violations. In this environment, when
even flouters escaped close scrutiny, minimal compliers had every
incentive to expand the range of reasonable interpretation and little
reason to expect that EPA would file enforcement lawsuits if they
92
crossed over the line into illegality. Subsequently produced industry
documents disclosed a conscious strategy during the 1980s of meeting
increased demand by building additional capacity into grandfathered
93
For example, an industry
plants while studiously avoiding NSR.
trade association advised its members in 1984 to identify such projects
as “upgraded maintenance programs” and to “downplay the life
extension aspects of these projects (and extended retirement dates)
94
by referring to them as plant restoration . . . projects.” If questions
arose, the industry group advised its members to deal exclusively with
state and local officials and to avoid “ask[ing] EPA because you won’t
95
Rather than go to EPA or Congress for relief,
like the answer.”
companies hired lawyers who came up with innovative interpretations
of the then-obscure RMRR exemption to characterize as “routine”
projects that had the effect of expanding capacity and lengthening
96
plant lifetimes. It would be hard to find a better example of the
minimal compliance strategy in action.
III. THE WEPCO LITIGATION
During the mid-1980s, EPA and the state permitting authorities
determined whether specific projects at existing plants triggered the
NSR requirements by employing the two-step analysis described above
97
on a case-by-case basis. This common sense approach, however, did
little to advance the overall statutory policy of ensuring that older
units at power plants would be replaced by more efficient and less
polluting units. In 1985, the Congressional Research Service reported
that the retirement age for power plants had increased from thirty
91. LASH ET AL., supra note 90, at 46; Andreen, supra note 89, at 72; Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833, 876 (1985); Mintz, supra note 36, at
10,501.
92. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 606 (statement of John Walke, NRDC).
93. Clean Air Act: New Source Review Regulatory Program, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works,
106th Cong. 99 (2000) [hereinafter Senate Clean Air Act Hearings] (statement of David
Hawkins, NRDC).
94. Id. at 100.
95. Id.
96. Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84, at 2.
97. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 1990).
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98

years to as long as sixty years. Although EPA enforcers occasionally
lowered the boom on flouters who built brand new facilities without
99
applying for a PSD permit, they did not focus much attention on
100
modifications to existing facilities. A new plant was quite visible to
state officials and nearby neighbors, but a life-extension project at an
existing plant that resulted in only slightly elevated emissions was
largely invisible to the public and the press.
A. The 1990 WEPCO Litigation
In 1988, EPA concluded that a major project undertaken by
Wisconsin Electric Power Company (“WEPCO”) at its Port
Washington plant near Milwaukee, Wisconsin had to undergo NSR
because the potential emissions from the facility after completion of
101
the project would exceed the actual emissions prior to the project.
The facility contained five coal-fired steam generating units, each with
a design capacity of eighty megawatts, that were constructed between
102
During the intervening years, the output had
1935 and 1950.
103
After
decreased substantially due to age-related deterioration.
hiring a consultant in 1983 to assess the plant’s overall condition, the
company decided that the fire units and the plant’s common facilities
would have to undergo “extensive renovation” to keep the facility in
104
Among other things, the study concluded that the air
operation.
heaters on four of the units had severely deteriorated, and the rear
105
The first
steam drums on a different four facilities had cracked.
condition kept four of the units from operating at full capacity, and
the second condition required a reduction in pressure to prevent a
106
The risk of a blowout was so serious at one of the units
blowout.
107
that the company had shut it down altogether.
The company then embarked on what it called a “life extension”
project consisting of various renovations that allowed the units to
98. PARKER ET AL., supra note 86, at 46.
99. See, e.g., United States v. La.-Pac. Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1162–63 (D. Colo.
1988).
100. Cassie N. Aw-yang, EPA’s Changes to the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement
Rule of the New Source Review Program: An Unlawful Threat to Public Health and Welfare? 27
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 321, 336 (2004); Spence, supra note 24, at 198.
101. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 905–06; PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 8.
102. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 905.
103. Id. at 905.
104. Id. at 905 (emphasis omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 905–06.
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operate beyond their planned retirement dates of 1992 in the case of
108
When
two of the units and 1999 in the case of the other three.
WEPCO presented its plan to the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission for approval, the commission consulted with the state
Department of Natural Resources to determine whether a PSD permit
109
The department referred the matter to EPA, which
was necessary.
110
conferred with the company on several occasions.
On September 1, 1988, the Acting Assistant Administrator for
Air, Don R. Clay, circulated a memorandum containing his
111
preliminary conclusion that the project would be subject to NSR.
Among other things, the memorandum rejected WEPCO’s claim that
112
In a separate
the project fit within the RMRR exemption.
memorandum, issued on February 15, 1989, Clay determined that
WEPCO could not meet its responsibilities merely by switching to lowsulfur coal; it would have to install scrubbers or equivalent
technologies capable of removing sulfur dioxide from the gas
113
EPA Administrator Lee Thomas accepted the Clay
stream.
114
memorandum, and the company appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of three major utility companies
and trade associations, as well as the National Coal Association,
115
General Electric and Westinghouse.
On January 19, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (WEPCO),
116
The court first
upheld EPA’s decision in all but one regard.
rejected WEPCO’s claim that the project did not involve a “physical
117
change.” It noted that the project included the replacement of four
steam drums that were sixty feet long, 50.5 inches in diameter and
5.25 inches thick as well as the air heaters in four units over a fouryear period during which each unit would be shut down for nine
118
In the court’s view, these projects clearly constituted
months.
“physical change[s].”
To WEPCO’s argument that a simple
replacement of equipment did not modify the facility, the court
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 906.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919 (citing congressional reports).
Id. at 906.
Id. at 903–04.
Id. at 901, 919.
Id. at 907–10.
Id. at 907–08.
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responded that the statute defined “modification” as “any physical
change” that increased emissions, and the life extension project
119
clearly involved physical changes at the facility. The court reasoned
that “Congress intended to stimulate the advancement of pollution
control technology,” and allowing companies to avoid NSR
120
indefinitely was inconsistent with that goal.
The court also rejected WEPCO’s contention that the changes
came within the RMRR exemption. Taking its cue from the Clay
memorandum, the court observed that EPA made this determination
on a case-by-case basis by “weighing the nature, extent, purpose,
frequency, and cost of the work, as well as other relevant factors, to
121
arrive at a common-sense finding.” Based on these factors, EPA had
122
determined that WEPCO’s proposed changes were not “routine.”
The court agreed that “the magnitude of the project (as well as the
down-time required to implement it) suggest[ed] that it [was] more
123
Furthermore, the court agreed with EPA that the
than routine.”
frequency and cost of the project supported the conclusion that
124
replacing the heaters was far from routine. In this regard, the court
stressed WEPCO’s own characterization of the project as a “life
extension” project of the sort that “would normally occur only once
125
Although it was true
or twice during a unit’s expected life cycle.”
that any repair of a critical component of a unit would technically
extend its life, EPA was not arbitrary in concluding that a project
intended to put off retirement of the entire plant by at least ten years
126
was not routine.
WEPCO also argued that the change would not result in an
increase in emissions for purposes of the new source performance
127
It acknowledged that the replacement
standard for power plants.
program would increase emissions, because the units would again be
able to operate at their design capacity, but it argued that the agency
128
had arbitrarily interpreted its regulations to include such increases.
In determining the pre-change emissions, the agency ignored the
“design capacity” of the unit and focused exclusively on the “actual
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 909.
Id. at 909–10.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 910–11.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 911–12 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
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129

current capacity” of the unit to produce emissions. Using the most
recent year’s emissions from all of the units as the baseline, the
agency concluded that the life extension project would cause no
additional emissions at two of the five plants, but would cause an
130
increase in emissions at the other three units. Noting that it did not
have jurisdiction to overturn the NSPS regulation (because exclusive
jurisdiction for challenge to EPA regulations under the Clean Air Act
131
lies in the D.C. Circuit ), the court upheld EPA’s interpretation of
that regulation to allow it to compare the most recent year’s hourly
132
emissions rate instead of a “representative” year’s rate.
On the separate question of whether the contemplated changes
would trigger NSR under EPA’s PSD regulations, the agency did not
fare as well. The NSR regulations for PSD areas required a permit for
any physical change in a “major stationary source” that would result in
133
EPA interpreted this
a “significant” increase in “net emissions.”
regulation to require the source’s operator to compare “actual prerenovation emissions with potential post-renovation emissions”
(measured in tons per year) to determine whether the difference
exceeded the “significance” thresholds (ordinarily forty tons per
134
In determining the baseline emissions the regulations
year).
required the source to use the average rate (in tons per year) for the
two years preceding the project date, unless EPA determined that a
135
In WEPCO’s
different time period would be more representative.
case, the agency used the years 1983 and 1984 as the representative
years because WEPCO had curtailed production during the year
preceding the project due to the safety risks posed by the cracked
136
steam drums.
Although the agency’s regulations applied to “an ‘increase in
actual emissions from a particular physical change,’” the agency
interpreted this language to require a comparison of the plant’s
baseline emissions with the plant’s “potential to emit” after the
137
WEPCO argued that this was an arbitrary
project was completed.
and capricious interpretation of the regulations because it was
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
ment).
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 913 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 913–14.
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006).
Wis. Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 914 n.6, 915.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 916; see also text accompanying note 70 (describing the forty-tpy requireWis. Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 916.
Id.
Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(3)(i)(a) (1988)).
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inappropriate in calculating post-renovation emissions to assume that
the plant would be operating at 100 percent capacity 24 hours a day
138
for 365 days per year. EPA responded that WEPCO could avoid that
result by agreeing to adhere to federally enforceable production
139
restrictions, but WEPCO did not want to go that route. Although
the court agreed with EPA that it did not have to rely on the
company’s own unenforceable estimates of future emissions, it was
nevertheless inappropriate for EPA to assume that the plant would be
operating full-time at maximum capacity in calculating post140
The court therefore set aside EPA’s
renovation emissions.
determination that the WEPCO project would increase emissions for
141
purposes of the PSD program.
B. Response to WEPCO
The electric power industry reacted to the rather disappointing
WEPCO holding in two ways. First, recognizing that WEPCO had
gotten into trouble when the state environmental agency had sought
advice from EPA, companies rarely sought applicability
142
Second, the industry
determinations from EPA after WEPCO.
sought relief from Congress, which was at that moment deliberating
over major amendments to the Clean Air Act offered by the George
H.W. Bush administration. The latter effort failed when changes
offered at the last minute by the administration failed to make it into
143
Instead,
the final version of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
the conference committee report urged EPA to revise its NSR
regulations to ensure that they were not inconsistent with WEPCO and
144
the new amendments to the statute.
When industry lobbyists learned that the administration had
begun to deliberate over changes to the NSR regulations, the head of
the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”) wrote to a friend in the
Department of Energy (“DOE”) to solicit his aid in securing “a good

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 917.
141. Id. at 918.
142. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 607 (statement of John Walke, NRDC).
143. Clean Air Act Implementation (Part 1), Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 288 (1991) [hereinafter House
Clean Air Act Implementation Hearings] (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
144. Id.

2013]

NEW SOURCE REVIEW ENFORCEMENT

1225

145

WEPCO fix.”
The letter provided several specific proposals for
146
Within days, DOE’s Acting Assistant
revising the NSR regulations.
Secretary for Fossil Energy wrote to EPA to complain that the current
draft of EPA’s proposed regulation was “not responsive to the needs
of the electric utility industry” and to demand “a good and
147
Unwilling to trust EPA to draft an
comprehensive WEPCO fix.”
acceptable proposal, DOE drafted its own proposal that included
148
High-level officials in EPA promptly
EEI’s proposed changes.
149
revised the proposal, but the revision was still unacceptable to DOE.
150
Representative Henry Waxman later
Once again, EPA acquiesced.
criticized the EPA’s political appointees for excluding “EPA staffers
who spent years on this issue” while allowing the rulemaking process
to be “taken over by DOE officials who kn[e]w only what the electric
151
utilities t[old] them.”
152
In June 1991, EPA proposed a “WEPCO Rule” that would have
amended the NSR regulations in three significant ways. First, the
agency proposed to amend the definition of “major modification[]”
for PSD areas to exclude “pollution control projects” that did not
render the relevant unit “less environmentally beneficial” on the
153
theory that they were not “physical or operational changes.”
Second, the agency proposed to clarify the methodology for
calculating baseline level of actual emissions to create a presumption
that “any 2 consecutive years within the 5 years prior to the proposed
change” would be “representative of normal source operations for a
154
This methodology would ensure that emissions increases
utility.”
and reductions at other units in the facility were contemporaneous

145. Anne M. Skalyo, The WEPCO-”Fix”: Out of the Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly
Decision, and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, a Pro-Utility Solution Evolved, 10 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 331, 373 (1992).
146. SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, AN INVESTIGATION OF EPA’S CLEAN AIR “WEPCO” RULE, STAFF REPORT (undated), reprinted in House Clean Air Act Implementation Hearings, supra note 143, at 314 [hereinafter HOUSE WEPCO INVESTIGATION REPORT].
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 315.
150. Id.
151. House Clean Air Act Implementation Hearings, supra note 143, at 283 (statement of
Rep. Henry Waxman).
152. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans;
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New
Stationary Sources, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,630 (June 14, 1991) [hereinafter EPA WEPCO Rule].
153. Id. at 27,630.
154. Id. at 27,636.
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with any emissions increases from the changed unit for netting
155
Third, the agency responded to the WEPCO remand by
purposes.
replacing the actual-to-potential emissions test for determining
whether there was a net increase in emissions with an “actual-tofuture-actual” test for all changes other than the construction of a new
156
unit or replacement of an existing unit. In calculating future actual
emissions, the source could use projected utilization of the source
during the two years after the change or any other representative two157
year period within the ten years following the change. It could also
take into account factors, such as “system-wide demand growth,” that
“would have occurred and affected the unit’s operations even in the
158
The agency
absence of the physical or operational change.”
reasoned that increases in emissions attributable to such independent
factors were not caused by the physical change because they would
159
have occurred anyway. The final rule that the agency published on
160
July 1, 1992 did not differ in any significant way from the proposal.
Although the WEPCO Rule created even more gray areas for
minimal compliers to exploit, EPA continued to leave the NSR
application determination to the utility companies undertaking
changes without requiring that they inform the permitting authorities
161
It did, however, agree to continue its
of those determinations.
practice of providing applicability determinations to companies that
162
Although the regulations did not address the
asked for them.
RMRR exemption, the preamble contained language that bore
directly on subsequent judicial interpretations of that exemption.
The preamble “clarif[ied]” that the determination of whether the
155. Id. The agency also proposed to amend its NSPS regulations to allow a source to
use as “its pre-change baseline its highest hourly emissions rate achievable during the 5
years prior to the proposed physical or operational change.” Id. at 27,631.
156. 1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34, at 32,323. The agency reasoned
that since there was no relevant operating history for wholly new units and replaced units,
it would not be possible “to reasonably project post-change utilization for these units, and
hence, their future level of ‘representative annual actual emissions.’” Id. For other
changes, past operating history and other relevant information could provide a basis for
reasonable projections. Id.
157. EPA WEPCO Rule, supra note 152, at 27,637. The actual-to-future-actual test
would not, however, apply to greenfield units at existing plants or to “reconstructed” units
for which the capital cost exceeded fifty percent of the replacement cost, because there
would be no experience upon which to base projections of future utilization. Id. at 27,636;
40 C.F.R. § 60.15(b)(1) (2012).
158. EPA WEPCO Rule, supra note 152, at 27,637.
159. Id.
160. 1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra note 34.
161. Id. at 32,332.
162. Id.
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repair or replacement of a particular item of equipment is “routine”
under the NSR regulations, while made on a case-by-case basis, should
be based on the source operator’s evaluation of whether that type of
equipment had been repaired or replaced by sources within the
163
relevant industrial category in the past.
C. NSR Simplification Proposals
Deterrence-based enforcement had a brief resurgence at the
outset of the Clinton administration, 164 but EPA’s focus shifted to
assistance as the agency navigated the minefield of the 104th
165
There was very little action on the regulatory front
Congress.
during President Clinton’s first term. An EPA-assembled advisory
group consisting of representatives from state agencies and industry
and environmental groups struggled with little success to come up
with additional changes to the NSR program that would be acceptable
166
On July 23, 1996, EPA published a
to all of the diverse interests.
proposed “NSR Simplification” rule that would have extended the
WEPCO Rule’s changes from the electric utility industry to other
167
In addition, the proposal would have created a new
industries.
exclusion for “clean unit[s],” which it defined as units that had
installed technologies meeting the BACT or LAER tests within the
168
Finally, the proposal would have allowed sources to
past ten years.
use plantwide applicability limits (“PALs”) to avoid NSR if they could
offset emissions from the project under consideration with emissions
reductions from any other unit in the entire plant, not just those
169
After state agencies and environmental
affected by the project.

163. Id. at 32,326.
164. See DOJ to Focus on Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, Top Official Says, 24
ENV’T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1140 (Oct. 15, 1993) (“The new leadership at DOJ is . . . increasingly emphasiz[ing] criminal enforcement of environmental laws . . . .”); One-Fifth of
Facilities Surveyed by Group Found to be in “Serious” Violation of Act, 24 ENV’T REP. CUR. DEV.
(BNA) 733 (Aug. 20, 1993) (noting that the fines EPA assessed for violations of the Clean
Water Act increased from $5–6 million in the late 1980s to $22 million in 1992).
165. Andreen, supra note 89, at 73; Mintz, supra note 36, at 10,502.
166. David A. Golden, The Need to Reform NSR Reform, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 170,
171 (1997); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-947, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SHOULD USE
AVAILABLE DATA TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF ITS REVISIONS TO THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW
PROGRAM 7 (August 2003) [hereinafter GAO, AVAILABLE DATA]; Bruce Barcott, Changing
All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 4, 2004, at 38.
167. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source
Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250 (July 23, 1996).
168. Id. at 38,255.
169. Barcott, supra note 166, at 38; Proposed Changes to New Source Program Could Narrow
Applicability of Current Rules, 27 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 621 (July 26, 1996).
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groups strongly objected to the changes, the agency put the proposal
170
on the back burner.
In July 1998, the agency issued another notice of proposed
rulemaking soliciting comment on one aspect of the actual-to-futureactual methodology and on a particular approach to PALs that was
171
not clearly specified in the earlier proposal. To the utility industry’s
chagrin, however, the proposal announced that the agency was having
second thoughts on whether it should allow sources to discount
emissions attributable to future demand in calculating actual-to172
In addition to proposing to disallow the
future-actual emissions.
“demand growth” exemption for other industries, the agency was now
proposing to repeal the “demand growth” provision in the WEPCO
173
The EPA explained that in the increasingly competitive
Rule.
environment of the deregulated marketplace, demand projections
were less dependable and incentives to cut corners were much
174
The agency also expressed concern that utility companies
higher.
were not filing the reports required by the WEPCO Rule detailing
175
Minimal
actual emissions for five years following the change.
compliers had apparently been exploiting the vagueness in the
176
regulations to avoid both NSR and their reporting obligations. This
time the affected industries objected strongly to the proposal, and the
177
agency returned to the drawing board.
IV. THE DOJ/EPA NSR ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE DURING THE
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
A. Preparing a Deterrence-Based Enforcement Initiative
While EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation (“OAR”) spent the
entire Clinton administration attempting to draft an NSR reform
proposal on which all affected parties could agree, the agency’s
170. NSR Proposal Supported by Industry; States, Environmental Groups Cite Harm, 27 ENV’T
REP. (BNA) 1139 (Sept. 20, 1996).
171. Notice of Availability, supra note42.
172. Id. at 39,860.
173. Notice of Availability, supra note 42, at 39,860.
174. Id.; Alec Zacaroli, NSR Measures to be Coordinated, Scheduled for Promulgation by May
1999, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 406 (June 19, 1998).
175. Notice of Availability, supra note 42, at 39,860.
176. Id.
177. Alec Zacaroli, Utilities Contend Proposed Changes to NSR Would Jeopardize Efficiency;
EPA Disagrees, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1230 (Oct. 23, 1998); Alec Zacaroli, Latest Attempt to
Rewrite Regulations Draws Objections from States, Industry, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1190 (Oct. 16,
1998).
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enforcement office was building strong cases for prosecuting dozens
of companies for violating the regulations that were already on the
books. By the mid-1990s, EPA enforcers were puzzling over economic
data suggesting that production had increased in several sectors of
the economy that were not experiencing much in the way of new
178
In the electrical power generation sector, for
construction.
example, there was very little new plant construction, but coal
consumption and electricity generation were increasing primarily due
to the efforts of utility companies to “optimize performance of
179
existing coal-fired facilities despite their increasing age.” In a classic
example of minimal compliance, utility companies found it cheaper
to keep the grandfathered plants running through life extension
180
projects than to invest in new capacity. The Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance (“OECA”) decided to launch a major
deterrence-based enforcement initiative aimed at the electric utility
industry and three other industries.
Preparing an enforcement case against a major utility company
was no easy task. First, EPA had to obtain information about the
projects that the target company had completed during the relevant
time period. EPA could obtain a great deal of relevant information by
submitting information requests under section 114 of the Clean Air
181
The responses to these requests could fill dozens of banker’s
Act.
boxes, and it could take the agency staff a long time to wade through
the documents and separate the wheat from the chaff. After that, the
agency could send a team of investigators to the plant to conduct a
182
If these
physical inspection of the operations and on-site records.
two steps yielded sufficient information to support a conclusion that
the source had undertaken a major modification without undergoing
NSR, the agency would typically present that information to the
company and initiate settlement negotiations. If the negotiations
stalled, EPA enforcement officials would prepare a file to refer to DOJ
attorneys, who would review the file and decide whether it merited
further prosecution. If DOJ decided to proceed with the case, it
178. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1692–93; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO 0458, CLEAN AIR ACT: NEW SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS COULD AFFECT UTILITY ENFORCEMENT
CASES AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO EMISSIONS DATA 10 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter GAO, NEW
SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS].
179. PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 5–6; see also Buckheit Testimony, supra note
84, at 3.
180. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 607 (statement of John Walke, NRDC);
PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 6.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1) (2006).
182. Id. § 7414(a)(2).
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would typically initiate another round of settlement negotiations
183
This cumbersome
before filing the case in a federal district court.
process could take years to complete.
An internal OECA memorandum outlined a strategy for a major
enforcement initiative aimed at public utility companies. The office
planned to “investigate this industry in a way quite different from
earlier, more traditional inspections” by focusing its inquiry on “only a
few issues and pollutants and expending considerable initial effort on
understanding this industry so as to be better equipped to identify
and recognize less-than-obvious changes/modifications that may have
184
The office would then “develop a list of possible
been made.”
185
Next, it would
changes on which it would focus its inspections.”
conduct inspections, demand information, and, if necessary, “depose
186
key plant personnel” at around twenty-five power plants. OECA was
“prepared to take enforcement action for noncompliance attributable
to triggering events that occurred since 1977” and to demand the
installation of technologies determined to be BACT and LAER at the
187
time the changes were made.
The agency followed up on the memorandum by sending more
188
The
than 100 investigators to more than thirty power plants.
investigations revealed that many of the nation’s largest power
companies had engaged in significant renovations without
189
In many cases the companies’ own accounting
undergoing NSR.
books revealed major improvement projects that could not possibly
have avoided increases in emissions that should have subjected them
190
The head of the air enforcement office concluded that
to NSR.
“‘[c]ompanies understood what was going on, and a lot of them

183. See GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 18.
184. Alec Zacaroli, Agency Request for Data on Boilermakers Prompts Alarm Among Coal-Fired
Utilities, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 638 (July 24, 1998) [hereinafter Zacaroli, Alarm].
185. Id.
186. Alec Zacaroli, Utility Group Asks OMB to Halt Efforts to Gather Data on Boiler Modification, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 833 (Aug. 21, 1998); Zacaroli, Alarm, supra note 184.
187. Zacaroli, Alarm, supra note 184.
188. N.Y. to Sue Midwest Plant Owners over Pollution, GENERATION WK., Sept. 22, 1999, at
1 [hereinafter N.Y. to Sue].
189. ROBERT S. DEVINE, BUSH VS. THE ENVIRONMENT 134–35 (2004); OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW SOURCE REVIEW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSISTENCY OF
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS WITH THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS,
JANUARY 2002 [hereinafter OLP ANALYSIS], reprinted in Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra
note 75, at 108.
190. Barcott, supra note 166.
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191

thought they could evade the law.’”
It was, in her view, “the most
192
A
significant noncompliance pattern E.P.A. had ever found.”
vigorous deterrence-based enforcement effort could bring about
widespread adoption of state-of-the-art control technologies capable
193
If the
of reducing emissions by eighty-five to ninety-five percent.
rule writers in OAR could not achieve closure on NSR simplification
reforms, perhaps OECA could achieve some useful clarification
194
through the litigation process.
On November 17, 1998, Eric V. Schaeffer, the head of the
regulatory enforcement division, issued a guidance document setting
out the agency’s policies for seeking injunctive relief in settling NSR
195
The purpose of the memorandum was to prevent minimal
cases.
compliers from gaining a competitive advantage by gaming the
196
system. The memo required EPA enforcement officials to insist at a
minimum that the sources install control technology or agree to
process changes that would result in emissions reductions equivalent
197
to BACT or LAER. In addition, companies should ordinarily not be
allowed to dismantle the project or submit to an emissions cap or
limit on hours of operation in order to avoid installing BACT or
198
LAER once EPA had filed an enforcement action against it.
EPA was not the only enforcement authority investigating NSR
violations by the electric utility industry. Like EPA, the State of New
York and several environmental groups had sent investigators to Ohio
to examine documents at the state public utility commission and the
199
state environmental agency. In September 1999, New York Attorney
191. Id. (quoting Sylvia Lowrance, Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA).
192. Id.
193. PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 9; Barcott, supra note 166.
194. See Christopher W. Armstrong, EPA’s New Source Review Enforcement Initiatives, 14
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 203, 203 (2000) (“The goal of these initiatives is to obtain civil
penalties and, more importantly, new emission controls which EPA has been unable thus
far to obtain through the formal rulemaking process.”); see also Elliot Eder & Robin L.
Juni, Has EPA Fired up Utilities to Clear the Air?, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 8, 8–9 (2000)
(listing the enforcement actions); Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1695 & n.104 (same).
195. Memorandum from Eric V. Schaeffer, Director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, Guidance on the Appropriate Injunctive Relief for Violations of Major New Source
Review Requirements (Nov. 17, 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/region07/air/nsr/
nsrmemos/nsrguida.pdf.
196. Id. at 2.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 3.
199. Pamela Najor, Environmental Groups to Sue Utility over Air Act Violations, 30 ENV’T
REP. (BNA) 1173 (Oct. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Najor, Air Act Violations]; N.Y. to Sue, supra
note 188.
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General Eliot Spitzer sent “60-day notices” to the owners of seventeen
power plants in five Midwestern states informing them that New York
planned to sue them under the Clean Air Act’s citizen enforcement
200
Soon
provisions for violating the statute’s NSR requirements.
thereafter, several national and local environmental groups sent a
letter notifying American Electric Power that they were planning to
sue it for failures by eleven of its plants in five states to comply with
201
Because the statute allows EPA to assume
the NSR requirements.
202
the lead role if it files a lawsuit within sixty days of the notices of
203
intent, the notices prodded EPA into action.
B. Filling Enforcement Actions
After almost two years of intense investigations and analyses of
industry documents, public utility submissions, employee testimony,
204
and the like, EPA sent a large number of referrals to DOJ for
205
DOJ attorneys reviewed EPA’s submissions, prepared
prosecution.
legal memoranda to support proposed allegations, hired independent
experts to provide testimony in upcoming trials, and met with
company lawyers in an attempt to settle the cases in advance of filing
206
them. On November 3, 1999, DOJ filed lawsuits against seven large
power companies representing thirty percent of the coal-fired
electrical generating capacity in the United States alleging that they
had engaged in major modifications without undergoing NSR at
207
The complaints sought both
more than twenty-five power plants.
monetary penalties of up to $27,000 per day and injunctive relief
200. Richard Perez-Pena, Possible Federal Pullout Clouds Northeast States’ Pollution Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at A1; N.Y. to Sue, supra note 188. Six other Northeastern states
joined the subsequently filed lawsuit as plaintiffs. Perez-Pena, supra.
201. Najor, Air Act Violations, supra note 199.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2006).
203. See Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 9 (arguing that the state notices were probably
filed to stimulate action on EPA’s part).
204. See Pamela Najor, Government Sues Electric Companies over New Source Review at 17
Power Plants, 30 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1269 (Nov. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Najor, 17 Power
Plants] (“‘It was a very complicated analysis that we had to do plant by plant.’” (quoting
Carol Browner, Administrator, EPA)).
205. OLP ANALYSIS, supra note 189, reprinted in Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75,
at 108; GAO, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS, supra note 178, at 10.
206. OLP ANALYSIS, supra note 189, reprinted in Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75,
at 108; Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84, at 3.
207. OLP ANALYSIS, supra note 189, reprinted in Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75,
at 109; Najor, 17 Power Plants, supra note 204. The government later added twelve more
power plants operated by the same companies to the lawsuit. Pamela Najor, EPA Amends
Suits Against Utilities to Allege Violations at 12 More Plants, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 375 (Mar. 3,
2000).
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requiring companies to install controls equivalent to current BACT or
208
At the same time, EPA
LAER, depending on the plant’s location.
filed an administrative enforcement action against the Tennessee
209
Valley Authority (“TVA”) making similar allegations. In December
2000, DOJ sued Duke Energy Co., one of the country’s largest utility
companies, accusing it of violating the NSR requirements at all eight
210
The states and environmental groups that had
of its power plants.
211
filed the earlier actions joined EPA in all of the lawsuits. It was the
212
largest enforcement effort EPA had ever launched.
The modifications at issue fell into four general categories: (1)
construction of new power generating units without seeking a permit;
(2) capacity expansion projects that increased the hourly generating
capacity of the affected units; (3) redesign of units after installation in
ways that eliminated or mitigated original design defects; and (4) life
extension projects that extended the useful life of boilers beyond that
213
The agency
contemplated when the plants were originally built.
argued that these projects were clearly physical changes that
increased net emissions, even under the liberal definitions of the
WEPCO Rule, and that they were not covered by the RMMR
exception because they were too extensive, too costly, and too
214
infrequently undertaken. The industry responded that the activities
targeted by EPA enforcers were meant merely to “refurbish or

208. Jaber, supra note 53, at 23; OLP ANALYSIS, supra note 189, reprinted in Senate NSR
Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 109. The agency also issued notices of violation to operators of eight additional plants not named in the lawsuits. Jack Torry, U.S. Sues Utilities for
Pollution at Coal-Fired Plants, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 4, 1999), available at
http://old.post-gazette.com/headlines/19991104pollution1.asp.
209. Barcott, supra note 166, at 38; Najor, 17 Power Plants, supra note 204. Since TVA
was technically an agency of the federal government, EPA attorneys believed that it would
be inappropriate to pursue a civil action against it in a federal district court. Cf. Michael
Janofsky, Court Rulings on Emissions Sharply Split Two Groups, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2004),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/04/us/court-rulings-on-emissions-sharplysplit-two-groups.html (noting that while the administration could file the TVA case in federal court, “that would involve one federal agency, the E.P.A., suing another, T.V.A., which
rarely happens”).
210. Andrew M. Ballard, Duke Power Claims EPA Is Changing Definition of “Routine Maintenance” Unfairly, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 11 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Ballard, “Routine
Maintenance”].
211. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 99 (statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Environment & Natural Resources Division, DOJ).
212. John H. Stam, Clinton’s Big Enforcement Initiative Poses Major Challenge for Bush Team,
Lawyer Says, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 293 (Feb. 16, 2001).
213. NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 10; Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at
1693–94.
214. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1693.
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maintain and improve the reliability and efficiency” of their facilities
215
and were therefore not “major modifications.”
C. Responding to the Enforcement Actions
The electric utility industry responded to the lawsuits in two
forums. In the courts, the individual companies played a defensive
game, responding to EPA’s accusations with highly technical legal
216
arguments designed to persuade the judges to dismiss the cases. In
the halls of the White House, Congress, and state regulatory agencies,
industry lobbyists seized the offensive with a number of strategies
designed to bring a halt to the government’s enforcement initiative
217
The
before the courts could rule on the merits of the claims.
amount of money at stake was so high (billions of dollars in potential
fines and pollution control costs) that the companies invested
218
In the meantime, they kept up
substantial sums in both efforts.
their efforts to optimize output and extend the lives of their older
219
plants.
1. Notice
The industry raised a host of objections to EPA’s enforcement
actions in both forums. The most frequently raised argument was
that EPA was unfairly changing the rules in the middle of the game
and had failed to give regulatees fair notice of its radical new
220
Companies had been
interpretations of the regulations.
215. Jaber, supra note 53, at 23.
216. See, e.g., John H. Stam, Supreme Court Ruling in Duke Energy Case Overturns Attempt to
“Interpret” Regulations, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 789 (Apr. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Stam, Duke Energy Case] (describing the legal arguments made by Duke Energy).
217. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 608 (statement of John Walke, NRDC).
218. Barcott, supra note 166, at 38
219. Aw-yang, supra note 100, at 336; Jeff Goodell, Blasts From The Past, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
July 22, 2001, at 31.
220. PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 16 (“[I]ndustry is charging EPA with
changing the rules in the middle of the game.”); Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 11; (arguing that EPA failed to give “fair notice of [its] legal interpretation of a ponderous, selfimplementing regulatory scheme”); Ballard, “Routine Maintenance,” supra note 210 (quoting Duke Power’s spokesman as stating that EPA “is unfairly and retroactively changing
some of its rules in the middle of the game”); Steven D. Cook, EPA Redefined Emissions Increase in Clean Air Act Case, Duke Energy Says,” 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1946 (Sept. 22, 2006)
(“The Environmental Protection Agency changed its interpretation of the rules governing
the new source review program well after it issued the regulations in 1980” (citing Brief for
Respondent at 4, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007) (No.
05-848), 2006 WL 2689784, at *4)); Najor, 17 Power Plants, supra note 204 (reporting that
the Edison Electric Institute believed that EPA’s interpretation of the law was “a case, at
bottom, of revisionist history”); Pamela Najor, TVA Tells Court EPA Failed to Give Notice to
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undertaking major efficiency-enhancing and life-extending projects
for twenty years, they argued, without EPA voicing serious
221
The agency had therefore “tacitly accepted” the
objections.
industry’s interpretation of the rules by “not objecting to state
222
Industry
nonapplicability determinations and permits.”
representatives maintained that companies had been asking EPA for
guidance on how to meet the NSR requirements, but the “guidance
223
EPA, they claimed, was therefore estopped from
never came.”
claiming that activities undertaken pursuant to those interpretations
224
violated the regulations.
EPA, environmental groups, and the downwind states had a
225
EPA maintained that the agency had not
number of responses.
changed its interpretation of the rules, but had merely stepped up its
enforcement of those rules in light of new information showing that
226
The agency had in fact issued
they were routinely being violated.
numerous letters, guidance documents, and applicability
determinations that should have made the industry well aware of
227
Moreover, WEPCO, which was
EPA’s positions on the issues.
Power Producers of “New” NSR Reading, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1921 (Sept. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Najor, “New” NSR Reading] (“TVA asked the court to set aside EPA’s new source review enforcement actions because of the lack of notice” of EPA’s “new interpretation” of
Clean Air Act provisions (citing Reply Brief of Petitioner, Tenn. Valley Auth.v. EPA, 278
F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-12310-EE), 2000 WL 34538031)).
221. Armstrong, supra note 194, at 204; Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 9; Julie R.
Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli, Analysis & Perspective, Reinterpretation of NSR Regulations Could
Have Costly Implications for Businesses, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 407 (Mar. 3, 2000).
222. Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 221; see also Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note
93, at 102 (statement of Bill Tyndall, Vice President of Environmental Services, Cinergy
Corp.) (describing EPA’s historical treatment of the modification rule); Senate NSR Policy
Hearings, supra note 75, at 66, (statement of Bill Pryor, Att’y Gen., Alabama) (describing
EPA’s enforcement actions as an “abrupt reversal of course without notice and comment
rulemaking and without consulting the States, which had the primary responsibility to implement NSR standards for over 20 years”).
223. Barcott, supra note 166, at 38 (quoting Dan Riedinger, Edison Electric Institute);
see also Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 221 (describing EPA’s failure to provide guidance
regarding NSR requirements).
224. See, e.g., Najor, “New” NSR Reading, supra note 220 (reporting TVA’s objections).
225. See Barcott, supra note 166, at 38 (quoting Eric Schaeffer, a former EPA official, as
stating that industry claims were “complete[] hokey”); see also Senate NSR Policy Hearings,
supra note 75, at 64 (statement of Eliot Spitzer, Att’y. Gen., New York) (rebutting industry
arguments).
226. Shogren, Decision Near, supra note 90; Laura Mahoney, New Source Review: California, Colorado Regulators Disagree on Need to Change Controversial Program, 32 ENV’T REP.
(BNA) 1399 (July 20, 2001) (quoting Carol Holmes, attorney, EPA & Steven Barhite, engineer, EPA).
227. See Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at 99–100 (statement of David Hawkins, NRDC) (stressing EPA’s “numerous communications,” including letters and applica-
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initiated in 1988, put the industry on notice that EPA was strictly
interpreting the RMRR exemption, and it ratified the agency’s
reliance on five factors—the “nature, extent, purpose, frequency, and
cost of the work”—in making case-by-case applicability
228
determinations. If a company wanted further guidance, all it had to
229
do was ask EPA for an applicability determination. In fact, very few
companies after WEPCO asked EPA for applicability determinations
because they preferred to determine the applicability of NSR to
230
particular projects on their own. Despite fair warning, EPA and the
states argued, the minimal compliers in the industry had pressed
ahead with unreasonable interpretations of the NSR rules to avoid the
231
cost of complying with the law.
That response was supported by documents and testimony that
emerged during the litigation. Long before the Seventh Circuit
issued its WEPCO decision, the Utility Air Regulatory Group
(“UARG”), an industry trade association devoted exclusively to
regulatory issues, made its members aware of EPA’s 1988 applicability
determination regarding the WEPCO facility. A UARG memorandum
advised readers that in order to qualify for the RMRR exemption, a
project had to be “frequent, inexpensive, able to be accomplished at a
scheduled outage, [could] not extend the normal economic life of
232
At conferences
the unit, [and] be of standard industry design.”
sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (“EPRI”) dating
back to the mid-1980s, participants recognized that “life extension
projects” would be needed to meet rising demand by plants that
bility determinations); Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 74 (statement of Eric
Schaeffer, Environmental Integrity Project) (emphasizing EPA’s consistent guidance);
Barcott, supra note 166, at 38 (“E.P.A officials issued frequent letters and bulletins telling
power companies exactly where the agency was drawing the line.”); Mahoney, supra note
226 (quoting EPA engineer Steven Barhite as stating that “[g]uidance letters and responses from EPA” were common). But see Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 221 (stating that EPA
has provided “scarce, if any, guidance or input” since the NSR requirements were first
promulgated).
228. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 1990); Senate NSR Policy
Hearings, supra note 75, at 64 (statement of Eliot Spitzer, Att’y. Gen., New York).
229. Public Health and Natural Resources: A Review of the Implementation of Our Environmental Laws—Parts I and II: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Gov’t. Affairs, 107th Cong. 61 (2002)
[hereinafter Senate Public Health Hearings] (statement of Eric V. Schaeffer, Former Director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, EPA); Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at
99–100 (statement of David G. Hawkins, NRDC).
230. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 607 (statement of John Walke, NRDC).
231. See Barcott, supra note 166, at 38 (stating that the “cost of installing new equipment [to comply with NSR] was, of course, the reason the companies had . . . skirted the
new–source review rules in the first place”).
232. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 175 (statement of Eliot Spitzer, Att’y
Gen., New York) (quoting the UARG document).
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exceeded their thirty-year designed lifetimes and that this required “a
233
At a 1984 EPRI
different approach than routine maintenance.”
workshop, participants were advised that since “[s]ome aspects of life
extension
projects
may
not
be
considered
routine
repair/maintenance/replacement,” companies should identify such
234
They were also
projects as “upgraded maintenance programs.”
advised to review their accounting practices because they “play a
235
significant role here.”
A report prepared by DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded
that EPA had “a reasonable argument under existing law that
enforcement of the new source review provisions in these cases [did]
not amount to an interpretation of the regulations that depart[ed]
236
More important, the
from a prior authoritative interpretation.”
237
courts were not at all receptive to the industry’s notice argument.
For example, in United States v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co.
238
(SIGECO), the court concluded that SIGECO could have known
with “ascertainable certainty” how EPA interpreted the term “routine”
239
in the context of life extension projects.
2. Complexity
The industry argued that the rules were far too complex to be
comprehensible. 240 EPA had issued far too many complicated
guidance documents, memos, letters and the like, some of which were
241
Because the permitting authorities
inconsistent with each other.
233. Id. at 174 (statement of Eliot Spitzer, Att’y Gen., New York) (quoting an industry
document).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 175.
236. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW SOURCE REVIEW: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE CONSISTENCY OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS WITH THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, at v (2002).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Cinergy Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908–09 (S.D. Ind.
2007); United States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1024 (S.D. Ind. 2003);
United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1121–22 (W.D. Wis. 2001);
Steven D. Cook, EPA to Proceed With Emissions Test Rule in Face of U.S. Supreme Court Decision,
38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 790 (Apr. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Cook, EPA to Proceed] (“‘The track
record for the fair notice defense is abysmal.’” (quoting testimony of John Walke,
NRDC)).
238. 245 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
239. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
240. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 14; Bebe Raupe, EPA Program Too
Complex, Unfair, Witnesses Tell Senate Field Hearing, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 373 (Mar. 3, 2000).
241. See Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 85 (statement of Donald Elliott, CoChair, Environmental Practice Group, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker) (“EPA’s many
changing interpretations of NSR over the years have created a legal mess of baffling com-
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determined whether NSR applied to projects on a case-by-case basis, it
was difficult for companies to know in advance whether any of the
many repair and renovation projects they undertook at their facilities
242
would subject the affected units to NSR.
EPA responded that the complexity of the regulations and the
proliferation of guidance documents stemmed from the fact that the
rules had to cover “over 20,000 diverse factories and power plants with
243
an almost infinite number of fact patterns.” They pointed out that
the companies that were targets of the enforcement actions were not
mom-and-pop companies with limited resources to spend on
ascertaining the meaning of the applicable regulations. Instead, they
were huge companies with a sophisticated trade association and
244
To a large degree, the
access to high quality legal advice.
complexity was attributable to minimal compliers in the industry who
had “lobbied EPA for exemptions, special rulings and interpretations
245
to address perceived or real inequities or policy goals.”
3. RMRR Exemption
The companies argued that many of the changes at issue were
covered by the “routine maintenance, repair and replacement”
246
That they might also extend the life of the
(“RMRR”) exemption.
247
plants was fortuitous. Because it was very difficult to store electricity
for use in emergencies when equipment malfunctioned, it was
essential for utility companies to keep all of their generating units in
operating order at all times, and this required constant

plexity.”); Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 626 (statement of Joseph Bast, President, Heartland Institute on New Source Review Reform) (“Since 1980, EPA has released
some 4,000 pages of ‘guidance’ and produced may (often conflicting) letters and several
proposals for NSR revision, none of them finalized.”); Mahoney, supra note 226 (“[T]here
is a lot of unnecessary complexity caused by the existence of far too many guidance documents, memos and letters that have been produced by EPA . . . .” (quoting Dave Ouimette,
Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment)).
242. Armstrong, supra note 194, at 205; GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at
12–13.
243. Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84; see also GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note
16, at 13.
244. Senate Public Health Hearings, supra note 229, at 35 (statement of Eric V. Schaeffer).
245. Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84; see also id. (finding it “somewhat disingenuous
for industry to request complicating provisions and then complain that the result is a more
complex program”).
246. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NEW SOURCE REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 9 (2002)
[hereinafter EPA NSR REPORT]; PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 16.
247. PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 16.
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248

maintenance.
At the same time, power plants operated under
conditions of extreme temperature and pressure where parts wear out
at different rates and must be replaced periodically to ensure against
249
If minor projects could trigger
unanticipated operational failures.
250
NSR, then every power plant would fall within its ambit.
EPA took the position that the RMRR exemption was applicable
251
only to minor maintenance activities engaged in on a regular basis.
The projects that the DOJ/EPA lawsuits had targeted, by contrast,
were major projects that required very large capital expenditures and
252
They
were undertaken infrequently, if ever, at the targeted plants.
often caused the relevant units to be removed from service for periods
253
and they
much longer than typical maintenance shutdowns,
sometimes involved years of planning in company departments that
254
In many cases, companies
were not responsible for maintenance.
had redesigned the replacement component to increase capacity,
255
regain lost capacity, or extend the lifetime of the unit.
In the many cases in which the plant had never undertaken a
project like the one at issue, the company typically argued that other
companies had engaged in such projects on a regular basis and that
the regulations required EPA to adopt an “industry-wide” approach to
256
EPA was unwilling to accept the “everyone is
defining “routine.”
doing it” defense. It took the position that EPA could properly look
to the company’s own past practices as well as industry experience in
257
The district court in
making the “routineness” determination.
SIGECO agreed that EPA was reasonable to focus its “frequency”

248. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at 101 (statement of William F. Tyndall,
Vice President, Environmental Services & Federal Affairs, Cinergy Services, Inc.).
249. Id.; EPA NSR REPORT, supra note 246, at 10.
250. EPA NSR REPORT, supra note 246, at 9; Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93,
at 86 (statement of Bob Slaughter, Gen. Counsel, National Petrochemical & Refiners Association); Bebe Raupe, New Source Review Program No Block to U.S. Supply, EPA Public Hearing
Told, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1357 (July 13, 2001) [hereinafter Raupe, No Block].
251. Jaber, supra note 53, at 23.
252. CONRAD SCHNEIDER, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, POWER TO KILL, DEATH AND DISEASE
FROM POWER PLANTS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING THE CLEAN AIR ACT 8 (2001).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.; see also Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 221 (describing EPA’s position).
256. Jaber, supra note 53, at 24; Steven D. Cook, Federal Court Says Industry Interpretation
Can Help Determine “Routine Maintenance,” 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 491 (Mar. 10, 2006); Najor,
“New” NSR Reading, supra note 220.
257. SCHNEIDER, supra note 252, at 8.
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inquiry on the specific unit at issue, and not on the frequency of
258
similar projects throughout the industry.
4. Hourly Emissions
As we have seen, the emissions rate adopted by the regulations
for new source performance standards (kilograms per hour) differed
from the rate adopted in the NSR regulations for PSD and
nonattainment areas (tons per year) because the 1977 amendments
259
employed the latter measure in defining major stationary sources.
EPA, state attorneys general, and environmental groups took the
position that it was entirely appropriate to define modification
260
The
differently in the two programs given the historical context.
industry argued that EPA could not interpret the word “modification”
to mean one thing in the NSPS program and another in the PSD and
261
nonattainment program.
The difference mattered. The RMRR regulations excluded
emissions increases due exclusively to an increase in operating hours
or production rate at a facility that had undergone no physical or
operational change; they did not speak to increases in emissions
attributable to an increase in hours of operation or production rate
262
The Supreme Court of
that resulted from a construction activity.
the United States ultimately held that the agency could find that a
physical or operational change that increased hours of operation and
263
thereby increased emissions subjected the source to NSR.
5. Statute of Limitations
A far more successful claim for the industry was that actions
based upon projects completed long ago were barred by the general
264
five-year statute of limitations for federal enforcement actions. EPA
responded that it took so long to file the lawsuits because the
evidence that the sources had violated the law was hidden in industry

258. United States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1008–09 (S.D. Ind.
2003).
259. See supra text accompanying note 73.
260. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 569–70 (2007).
261. Id.; Jaber, supra note 53, at 24.
262. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. at 579.
263. Id. at 581.
264. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2006); see also, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation
L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 274, 287–88 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that the statute of limitations
barred claims involving a project that had been completed fifteen to twenty years prior to
the action).
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financial files and was therefore not easily accessible to agency
265
Because owners were not required to notify EPA or a
inspectors.
state permitting authority before beginning a project that might
trigger the NSR requirement, the agency did not even know that the
project was initiated much less whether it should have triggered
266
The courts were not especially sympathetic to EPA’s reasons
NSR.
for belated filings. Several courts held that the statute of limitations
barred claims for civil penalties involving projects that had been
267
completed more than five years prior to the action. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, held that the violations were
of a continuing nature and the statute of limitations did not begin to
268
run until they were corrected. Since the statute of limitations refers
only to monetary damages, some courts allowed claims for injunctive
269
relief to proceed.
D. Litigation End Runs
The electric utility industry also developed strategies for avoiding
the DOJ/EPA lawsuits. One strategy was to strike a sweetheart
settlement deal with a state agency before the federal lawsuit was
270
filed. Soon after EPA sued Tampa Electric Company (“TECO”), for
example, the company entered into a settlement agreement under
which it agreed to decrease emissions over a ten-year period by
converting its largest plant from coal to natural gas and using high271
efficiency technologies to control emissions at its other plants.
Although EPA and DOJ strongly objected to the Florida settlement
272
when it was announced, the strategy appeared to work as the federal
government ultimately settled its claims against TECO on terms very

265. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 16–17.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., EME Homer City Generation, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88; United States v.
Westvaco Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 439, 444 (D. Md. 2001); United States v. Am. Elec. Power
Serv. Corp., 136 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2001); see generally Thaddeus R. Lightfoot,
Sand Through the Hourglass: PSD Enforcement and the Statute of Limitations, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 11342 (2002) (providing a detailed overview of different factors that affect whether statute of limitations bars claims relating to PSD violations).
268. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n., Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 F.3d 410, 418–19
(6th Cir. 2007).
269. See, e.g., Westvaco Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d at 445; Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 136 F.
Supp. 2d at 814; see also Lightfoot, supra note 267.
270. Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 59.
271. Id.; EPA Official Bashes Tampa Electric NOx Plan, MEGAWATT DAILY, Dec. 9, 1999.
272. EPA Official Bashes Tampa Electric NOx Plan, supra note 271; Justice Dept. Slams TECO
Settlement with Florida, 4 MEGAWATT DAILY, Dec. 15, 1999.
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similar to the Florida arrangement except for the addition of a $3.5
273
million fine and specific milestones over the ten-year period.
Utility industry lobbyists also sought to undermine EPA’s
enforcement initiative by persuading sympathetic members of
Congress to attach a rider to a pending appropriations bill during the
waning days of the 106th Congress to allow companies to continue
their past optimization and life extension practices while the litigation
274
In a November 10, 1999 letter to several of its allies,
was pending.
the Edison Electric Institute and several other industry organizations
warned that the enforcement action had “effectively paralyzed the
electric utility industry’s repair and maintenance programs” with
potentially “severe implications for supply reliability in the near
275
The move failed, however, when the chairman of the
future.”
House Appropriations Committee objected that it was another one of
the special interest riders that he had been struggling to keep out of
276
the bill.
E. Preparing New Cases
The EPA/DOJ enforcement initiative continued unabated for
the remainder of the Clinton administration. Predicting that a
George W. Bush administration would rein in EPA enforcement, the
head of regulatory enforcement at EPA pushed his staff to build as
277
Working fourteenmany case files as possible for referral to DOJ.
hour days, the staff referred violations at twelve more power plants
278
In
owned by the original defendants to DOJ for prosecution.
addition, EPA investigators sent demands for information to twentyfive to thirty companies that were not included in the original
279
lawsuits.

273. Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 59; EPA Files More Charges Against Utilities,
GENERATION WK., Mar. 8, 2000.
274. Atmospheric Pollution; EPA Bares Its Teeth at Polluters with Legal Action, POWER ECON.,
Jan. 31, 2000, at 17; Utilities Want Protection from Suits, GENERATION WK., Nov. 17, 1999.
275. Utilities Want Protection From Suits, supra note 274.
276. Barcott, supra note 166.
277. Peyton Sturges, DOJ, EPA Officials Detail Priorities, Future Initiatives at ABA Conference,
31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 497 (Mar. 17, 2000); Samantha Levine, At the Top of His Lungs, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 2002, at 28.
278. Levine, supra note 277; EPA Files More Charges Against Utilities, supra note 273.
279. EPA Targeting More Coal Plants, Attorney Charges, PLATTS ENERGY REP., Nov. 6, 2000.
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F. Settlements
Many of the defendants were anxious to settle the cases on terms
quite favorable to the government. 280 By the end of the Clinton
administration, EPA had reached settlement agreements with owners
of one-third of the country’s refining capacity in which they agreed to
pay hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties and to install modern
281
Electric utility companies were
pollution-control technologies.
more inclined to force EPA to prove that they had violated the NSR
282
regulations at trial. By the end of the Clinton administration, EPA
283
had reached only one settlement with a major utility company. The
government reached agreements in principal with Cinergy Corp. and
Dominion Corp., under which Cinergy agreed to spend $1.4 billion
and Dominion agreed to spend $2.3 billion for pollution-reduction
upgrades and both companies agreed to pay a total of almost $69
284
million in civil penalties and supplemental environmental projects.
Neither agreement was finalized, however, before the Bush
administration radically changed the direction of EPA’s policies
regarding NSR.
V. THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION REWRITES THE RULES
At the outset of the George W. Bush administration, it appeared
that the comfortable unregulated world that grandfathered power
plants inhabited was about to undergo dramatic change as DOJ and
EPA pressed forward with their aggressive deterrence-based
enforcement agenda. The agencies had sued thirty-four power plants,
entered into one major settlement, and were on the verge of settling
285
two other actions. Many of the original defendants were in serious
settlement negotiations, and EPA was in similar negotiations with sixty
facilities that had already received notices of violation but had not yet

280. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1694–95.
281. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 98 (statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Environment & Natural Resources Division, DOJ); Levine, supra note
277; Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1694–95.
282. Jaber, supra note 53, at 25.
283. Id.; Pamela Najor, EPA Settles with One of Seven Utilities Sued for New Source Review Violations, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 374 (Mar. 3, 2000).
284. Brian Broderick, Enforcement: Ohio-Based Utility to Reduce Emissions at 10 Coal-Fired
Plants in Air Act Settlement, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 10 (Jan. 5, 2001); Cinergy to Settle on Air Pollution Charges, GENERATION WK., Dec. 27, 2000; Dominion Settles EPA, N.Y. Emissions Inquiries, GENERATION WK., Nov. 22, 2000.
285. NSR BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 25, at 10 (settlements); Perez-Pena, supra
note 200 (lawsuits).
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286

been sued.
At the same time, EPA was busily investigating more
287
than 100 facilities for potential NSR violations.
Yet, just as the litigation was on the verge of bringing about
major upgrades at grandfathered plants, the George W. Bush
administration launched major legislative and administrative
initiatives to change the rules in ways that would ensure that aging
power plants could continue to emit pollutants at the same rates that
288
The message that the litigation
they were emitting in the 1970s.
defendants received was that they should prolong their lawsuits until
the Bush administration or Congress put less restrictive requirements
in place, and then ask the judge to dismiss the cases on the ground
that the agency no longer adhered to its former interpretation of the
rules. Not surprisingly, many public utility companies adopted a
strategy of resistance and delay that put off the day of reckoning for
many years.
During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush
projected the image of a pro-business conservative with a rather
289
His running mate, Dick Cheney,
benign view of the environment.
by contrast, had no use for environmentalists and was disinclined to
compromise with people who did not share his views about the need
290
When the
to dramatically expand the nation’s energy resources.
Supreme Court declared the Bush/Cheney ticket to be the winners of
the closely contested election, the electric utility and coal industries
291
President Bush appointed New Jersey governor
were pleased.
Christie Todd Whitman, a pro-business Republican moderate who
had been an outspoken proponent of the NSR lawsuits, to be
292
He appointed Jeffrey Holmstead, a
Administrator of EPA.
lawyer/lobbyist for an electric utility trade group, to be the Assistant
293
Administrator for Air and Radiation. As it turned out, however, the
locus of power on environmental issues in the Bush administration
294
was in the Office of the Vice President.

286. John J. Fialka and David S. Cloud, White House Review Freezes EPA Inquiry, WALL ST.
J., June 28, 2001, at A3; Perez-Pena, supra note 200.
287. Perez-Pena, supra note 200.
288. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1678; Barcott, supra note 166, at 38.
289. See Margaret Kriz, Power Struggle, 33 NAT’L J. 942 (Mar. 31, 2001) (observing that
“Bush sought to appeal to voters on opposite sides of environmental issues”).
290. BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY, at ch.4 (2008).
291. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Barcott, supra note 166, at 38.
292. Barcott, supra note 166; Goodell, supra note 219, at 31.
293. Barcott, supra note 166; John Judis, King Coal, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 5, 2002.
294. GELLMAN, supra note 290, at ch.4.
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A. Industry Demands Relief
Well aware of the fact that many NSR enforcement lawsuits had
been filed during the last two years of the Clinton administration and
that many more cases were in the queue, 295 industry groups that had
contributed heavily to the Bush presidential campaign began to exert
296
pressure at the highest levels. The industries affected by NSR spent
millions of dollars on a massive lobbying campaign headed by former
Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour and
297
The president of the
former Montana governor Marc Racicot.
Edison Electric Institute, a college classmate of the president who had
raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for his campaign, met three
times with Deputy Energy Secretary Francis S. Blake to press the
298
On the enforcement front, the stakeholder
industry’s case.
negotiations over NSR reforms that had been going on since the
WEPCO decision were suddenly terminated by the industry
participants who concluded that they could get a better deal by
299
appealing directly to the White House.
Though vastly outgunned, environmental groups did what they
could to keep the enforcement initiative alive. The threat that rolling
back the NSR regulations would pose to the ongoing litigation was a
dominant theme in environmental group opposition to all of EPA’s
300
They attempted to seize the offensive
NSR rulemaking initiatives.
with a major publicity campaign, replete with media events,
advertising and internet organizing, to force the Southern Company,
one of the country’s largest emitters of SO2 and NOx and a target of
EPA’s enforcement initiative, to close some of its ancient coal-fired
301
power plants and to reduce emissions dramatically from the others.

295. See supra text accompanying notes 207–210.
296. See Barcott, supra note 166 (campaign contributions); Kriz, supra note 289 (lobbying); Douglas Jehl, Push for Oil Prompts Review of Pollution Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2001, at
A1 (lobbying by energy giant ExxonMobil); Pamela Najor, Business RoundTable Proposes
“Blueprint” to Protect Environment by Using Technology, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 319 (Feb. 16,
2001) (lobbying); Eric Pianin & Dan Morgan, EPA Will Ease Coal Plant Rules; Incentives to
Replace Pollution Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2002, at A1.
297. Barcott, supra note 166; Shogren, Decision Near, supra note 90.
298. Pianin & Morgan, supra note 296.
299. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 91 (statement of John Walke, NRDC).
300. See, e.g., Raupe, No Block, supra note 250.
301. Steve Cook, Emissions from Southern Electric Utility Target of Campaign by Environmental Groups, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 636 (Apr. 6, 2001).
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B. The Cheney Task Force Report
The Bush administration was quite receptive to the industry
overtures. Nine days after the inauguration, President Bush asked
Vice President Cheney to chair a task force of high-level government
officials to recommend a national energy policy. 302 During the task
force’s deliberations, an aide to Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham
sent an email to energy company executives asking what they would
do to meet the nation’s energy needs if they were “King, or Il
303
Several of the respondents put NSR reform at or near the
Duce.”
304
top of their lists. The executives promised that halting the lawsuits
would increase electricity generation more quickly than any other
305
Senators John Breaux (Dsuggestion on the task force’s agenda.
Louisiana) and James Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) wrote to Cheney to urge
him to suspend the ongoing lawsuits pending a full investigation of
306
EPA’s NSR policies and their impact on electricity and fuel supplies.
Although EPA Administrator Christie Todd Whitman was a
member of the task force, EPA officials did not have the same degree
of access to the task force’s behind-the-scenes deliberations as some of
the other participants. When Associate Administrator Tom Gibson
attempted to correct inaccurate language and erroneous assumptions
307
Two weeks before
in a draft of the report, his input was ignored.
the task force’s report was published, Whitman wrote a memorandum
to Cheney noting that the real issue for the industry was the
enforcement cases, and warning that the ongoing settlement
negotiations with the defendants in those cases would “likely slow
308
She advised Cheney that the administration would
down or stop.”
“pay a terrible political price if [it] undercut or walk[ed] away from”
309
the enforcement cases. Whitman’s overtures, however, were no

302. NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GRP., NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY REPORT: RELIABLE,
AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2001)
[hereinafter NEPDG ENERGY POLICY REPORT].
303. Barcott, supra note 166.
304. Id.
305. Bush Administration Conflicted Where EPA Lawsuits Concerned, U.S. COAL REV., May
14, 2001.
306. Jehl, supra note 296; Pamela Najor, Inhofe, Breaux Ask Bush Administration to Suspend
New Source Review Enforcement, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 583 (Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Najor,
Suspend NSR Enforcement].
307. Barcott, supra note 166.
308. Steve Cook, Whitman Warned Administration in 2001 Against Attack on Plant Modification Rules, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2277 (Oct. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Cook, Whitman Warned].
309. Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., How Power Lobby Won Battle of Pollution
Control at E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A1 (quoting Whitman memo).
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match for a “parade of industry groups—including the CEOs of major
electric utilities” that met with Cheney and other members of the task
310
force to complain about the lawsuits.
The task force’s report, published in May 2001, projected the
energy industry’s message that environmental regulations had unduly
constrained the nation’s ability to modernize its energy
311
The report recommended that the president direct
infrastructure.
EPA, in consultation with DOE and other agencies, to “review [NSR]
regulations,
including
administrative
interpretation
and
implementation, and report to the President within 90 days on the
impact of the regulations on investment in new utility and refinery
generation capacity, energy efficiency, and environmental
312
protection.” It also recommended that the president direct DOJ “to
review existing enforcement actions regarding NSR to ensure that the
enforcement actions are consistent with the Clean Air Act and its
313
regulations.” On the legislative front, the task force recommended
that the president direct EPA to propose “multi-pollutant legislation”
that would “establish a flexible, market-based program to significantly
reduce and cap emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and
314
mercury from electric power generators.”
310. Michael Isikoff, A Plot to Foil the Greens, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 2001, at 36; see also Drew
& Oppel, supra note 309 (describing the meetings and EPA’s warnings).
311. NEPDG ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 302, at xii; see also Goodell, supra note
219 (“[I]t was clear that Big Coal’s message had been heard.”).
312. NEPDG ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 302, at app.1.
313. Id.
314. Id. The National Coal Council, an industry-dominated advisory committee assembled by the Secretary of Energy to advise him on various coal-related issues, issued another
influential report the same month. NAT’L COAL COUNCIL, INCREASING ELECTRICITY
AVAILABILITY FROM COAL-FIRED GENERATION IN THE NEAR TERM 1 (May 2001); see also Steve Cook, Federal Coal Panel Calls for Loosening Clean Air Act Requirements for Power Plants, 32
ENV’T REP. (BNA) 856 (May 4, 2001) (reporting on the National Coal Council’s recommendations); Goodell, supra note 219 (“[C]ritics claim [the National Coal Council] is
stacked with coal-industry representatives . . . .”); CONRAD SCHNEIDER, CLEAN AIR TASK
FORCE, SCRAPING THE “BOTTOM OF THE BARREL” FOR POWER 1 (2001) (“[A] review of the
membership of the Coal Council makes clear that it is dominated by pro-coal interests.”).
The report concluded that the industry’s potential to add an additional 40,000 megawatts
of electrical power production could only be realized if there was “a significant change in
regulatory interpretation and enforcement regarding the installation of new technologies
at existing power plants.” NAT’L COAL COUNCIL, supra, at 3. The report claimed that
EPA’s recent changes in enforcement procedure, which consisted of “reinterpreting as
violations of the Clean Air Act what had heretofore been considered routine maintenance
at power plants,” had had a “direct and chilling effect on all maintenance and efficiency
improvements and clean coal technology installations at existing power plants.” Id. A subsequent investigation revealed that the principle author of the report was an attorney who
was defending two companies in the EPA/DOJ litigation and that it was rushed into draft
form in order to be useful to the Vice President’s Energy Task Force. Steve Cook, Refining
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The industry response to the task force report was quite positive.
A spokesperson for EEI said that it was “very encouraged the new
source review program is receiving considerable attention from the
315
administration and the energy task force.” Asked about the report’s
impact on the pending settlement negotiations in the NSR cases, he
expressed the view that “it would make sense for them to wait and see
316
Environmental groups were
what direction the review takes.”
shocked by the recommendation to DOJ and charged that the Bush
administration was inserting politics into the law enforcement process
by sending a thinly veiled message to the defendants in the litigation
317
not to settle with the government. Environmental groups and state
attorneys general made it clear that they would continue to pursue
their citizen enforcement actions if the government backed out of the
318
litigation.
Both EPA and DOJ put into place an immediate freeze on new
NSR enforcement actions pending the completion of the 90-day
review by EPA of its NSR policies and DOJ’s review of the pending
319
EPA even sent a letter to recipients of its demands for
litigation.
320
information instructing them to put the demands on hold.
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham took the position that DOJ
should abruptly drop at least some of the lawsuits, but Whitman
strongly supported moving ahead with the suits that had already been
filed so as not to send a message to all EPA regulatees that they could
321
violate the environmental laws with impunity. Not surprisingly, the
companies participating in the settlement negotiations were not
nearly as eager to agree to expensive upgrades while EPA and DOJ
322
were seriously re-evaluating the bona fides of the original lawsuits.
With the announcement of the reviews, sales of pollution control
devices declined sharply because companies were not inclined to
“Routine Maintenance” Definition Considered in Program Reform, Official Says, 32 ENV’T REP.
(BNA) 2193 (Nov. 16, 2001) (citing John Walke, NRDC); Isikoff, supra note 310.
315. Steve Cook, White House Plan Offers Possible Relief to Power Companies in Pollution Lawsuits, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 950 (May 18, 2001) [hereinafter Cook, White House Plan].
316. Id.
317. Id. (citing John Coequyt, Environmental Working Group, and John Walke,
NRDC).
318. Steve Cook, Utility, Refinery Lawsuits Going Ahead Despite Bush-Mandated Policy Review, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1794 (Sept. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Cook, Lawsuits Going Ahead]
(states); Cook, White House Plan, supra note 315 (environmental groups).
319. Fialka & Cloud, supra note 287.
320. Letter from James Inhofe and Arlen Specter to Christine Todd Whitman (June 20,
2001) [hereinafter Letter], reprinted in Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 22.
321. Perez-Pena, supra note 200, at A1.
322. Shogren, Decision Near, supra note 90 (citing Connecticut Att’y Gen. Blumenthal).
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spend a lot of money on technologies that might not be required by
323
the new administration.
As the Justice Department’s internal investigation of the NSR
cases proceeded apace in the Office of Legal Counsel, attorneys in the
Environment and Natural Resources Division quietly pressed ahead
with the discovery, expert preparation, and motions practice in the
324
The Justice Department’s 90-day report, published
existing cases.
on January 16, 2002, concluded that EPA’s interpretation of its NSR
regulations and its position in the ongoing litigation were
325
“reasonable.” In particular, EPA’s position that it had not departed
from its previous interpretations of the regulations was reasonable,
326
the report concluded. Since the ongoing enforcement actions were
“supported by a reasonable basis in law and fact, any decision to
withdraw, terminate, or otherwise circumscribe them would constitute
327
policy determinations . . . that properly rest[ed] with EPA.”
Industry representatives disagreed with the DOJ conclusion, but they
noted that the administration could adopt a different policy in the
328
future, and, in their view, it should do just that.
Attorney General John Ashcroft told the press that DOJ would
continue to pursue the litigation that had already been filed until and
unless EPA changed either its enforcement policy or the
329
regulations. For the next several months, DOJ pursued the lawsuits
quite vigorously. In January, it entered into a proposed settlement
agreement with PSEG Fossil in which the New Jersey utility company
agreed to spend $337 million over a ten-year period on scrubbers and
selective catalytic reduction technologies capable of reducing SO2
emissions by ninety percent and NOx emissions by eighty percent at
330
its plants in Jersey City and Hamilton Township. The company also
agreed to pay $1.4 million in civil penalties and spend $6 million on
331
supplemental environmental projects.
323. Id.
324. Cook, Lawsuits Going Ahead, supra note 318.
325. Steve Cook, DOJ Announces New Source Review Cases May Proceed, Asserting Law Supports Them, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 117 (Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Cook, Cases May Proceed];
Christopher Marquis, E.P.A. Power Plant Cases to Proceed, Ashcroft Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2002, at A12.
326. Cook, Cases May Proceed, supra note 325, at 117; Justice Backs EPA on New Sources . . .
Sort of, ELEC. DAILY, Jan. 22, 2002.
327. Cook, Cases May Proceed, supra note 325.
328. Id.
329. Marquis, supra note 325.
330. Steve Cook, New Jersey Electric Utility Will Spend $337 Million for Controls at Power
Plants, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 222 (Feb. 1, 2002).
331. Id.
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The NSR enforcement initiative suffered a major blow in
February 2002 when Eric Schaeffer, the Director of the Office of
332
In a letter that was widely
Regulatory Enforcement, resigned.
reported in the press, Schaeffer complained that the NSR reforms
that were emerging from the negotiations between EPA, the White
House and the Department of Energy would completely undermine
333
his office’s attempts to enforce the existing regulations. Indeed, the
334
prolonged debate was itself affecting the settlement negotiations.
He complained that the agency was about to “snatch defeat from the
jaws of victory” in its ongoing enforcement efforts as reports of the
agency’s largely unsuccessful battles with “a White House that seems
determined to weaken the rules we are trying to enforce” caused
defendants in existing enforcement actions to walk away from
335
settlement negotiations.
The government’s enforcement efforts suffered another blow
when Administrator Whitman testified on March 7, 2002 before the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that NSR review was “a
336
She also complained that the
program that needs to be fixed.”
agency spent “an awful lot of money” on legal fees “that could go to
337
But she promised that the Bush
enhancing the environment.”
administration was “not going to undermine the Clean Air Act,” and it
338
was not going to “stop enforcing the environmental laws.”
Nevertheless, she conceded that if she were a plaintiff’s attorney, she
would “not settle anything until I knew what happened” in the lawsuit
339
against TVA, which at that time was pending in the Sixth Circuit.
340
That concession, which was widely reported in the press, generated
much criticism for sending a message to defendants in the NSR
litigation that they should abandon ongoing settlement

332. Manimoli Dinesh, Frustrated EPA Official Quits over Reforms, OIL DAILY, Feb. 28,
2002.
333. Kenneth W. Betz, Energy and Environmental Interests Collide over New Source Review,
ENERGY USER NEWS, Apr. 1, 2002, at 1; Levine, supra note 277.
334. Betz, supra note 333.
335. Dinesh, supra note 332; see also Letter, supra note 320 (describing EPA’s largely
unsuccessful battles with the White House).
336. Senate Public Health Hearings, supra note 229, at 18 (statement of Christine Todd
Whitman, Administrator, EPA).
337. Id. at 30.
338. Id. at 18.
339. Id. at 30.
340. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, E.P.A. Chief Says Pollution Suits Will Probably Stay Unsettled Until Related Case Is Decided, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2002, at A17.
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341

negotiations.
A prominent utility company lawyer allowed that it
should not “shock anybody that a good lawyer would want to see how”
342
the TVA lawsuit was resolved.
C. Changes to the NSR Regulations
EPA’s 90-day report, which finally came out in June 2002,
concluded that “the NSR program ha[d] not significantly impeded
343
investment in new power plants,” but it had “impeded or resulted in
the cancellation of projects which would maintain and improve
344
reliability, efficiency and safety of existing energy capacity.” This, in
turn, had “result[ed] in lost capacity, as well as lost opportunities to
345
A large
improve energy efficiency and reduce air pollution.”
volume of anecdotal evidence suggested that “concern about the
scope of the routine maintenance exclusion” was having an “adverse
impact on projects that affect availability, reliability, efficiency, and
346
This was exactly what the industry had been arguing ever
safety.”
since EPA launched the NSR enforcement initiative in 1999. Overall,
the report concluded that the NSR program had significant but
347
difficult to quantify environmental and public health benefits, but
those benefits could be achieved “much more efficiently and at much
lower cost” if Congress enacted the administration’s proposed “Clear
348
Pending legislative reform, the
Skies” cap-and-trade legislation.
agency would implement changes to the existing NSR program to
“add to the clarity and certainty of the scope of the routine
349
maintenance exclusion.”
Simultaneously with the release of the report, EPA Administrator
Whitman announced two major rulemaking initiatives related to NSR.
The first action would be to revive and finalize the NSR Simplification
350
The second initiative, called the “Safe Harbor” Rule, would
Rule.
greatly expand the RMRR exemption by providing a safe harbor for
any changes for which the capital expenditure did not exceed a
341. Id. (citing Sen. Joseph Lieberman and John Stanton, National Environmental
Trust).
342. Id. (quoting Scott Segal, attorney, Bracewell & Guiliani).
343. EPA NSR REPORT, supra note 246, at 1.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 11.
347. Id. at 1, 2.
348. Id. at 2.
349. Id. at 11.
350. Steve Cook, Long-Awaited Administration Reforms Seek Relaxed Requirements for Power
Plants, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1309 (June 14, 2002) [hereinafter Cook, Relaxed Requirements].
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specified threshold, whether or not the change resulted in an
351
The agency was considering cost thresholds
increase in emissions.
in the range of 1.5% through 15% of the asset value of the changed
352
unit.
The Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance staff
urged the OAR staff to draft the rules with enforcement in mind, and
Office of Air and Radiation changed the NSR Simplification Rule
353
OECA’s more serious concerns,
slightly to meet their concerns.
354
however, were with the Safe Harbor Rule. Noting that nearly all of
the cases in the ongoing NSR litigation raised issues under the RMRR
regulations, OECA attorneys were concerned that a regulation
providing a bright-line threshold would undermine their argument
that the RMRR exemption had to be applied on a case-by-case basis
355
It would also limit their
based on factors highlighted in WEPCO.
selection of remedies, because a judge was unlikely to require a
source to install expensive pollution controls to remedy violations of
356
rules that were no longer in effect. OECA warned that a threshold
any greater than 1% to 2% of the unit’s cost would mean that 95% to
98% of modifications challenged in the ongoing litigation would
357
come within the Safe Harbor Rule.
358
The final NSR Simplification Rule that the agency published
on December 31, 2002 had five major components. First, in
determining “baseline” emissions, sources were allowed to use any
359
consecutive two-year period from the previous ten years, rather than
the two-year period immediately preceding the change. Second, the
rule prescribed an “actual-to-future-actual” test for all sources that was

351. Id.
352. Id.
353. GAO, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS, supra note 178, at 15–16.
354. See id. at 17 (noting that “EPA enforcement staff expressed concern that more explicitly defining what facility changes qualify for the routine maintenance exclusion [the
Safe Harbor Rule] . . . had the most potential to negatively affect” ongoing NSR litigation).
355. Id. at 17; see also supra text accompanying note 228 (describing the WEPCO factors).
356. GAO, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS, supra note 178, at 17.
357. Id. at 17–18.
358. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source
Review (NSR): Baseline Emissions Determination, Actual-to-Future-Actual Methodology,
Plantwide Applicability Limitations, Clean Units, Pollution Control Projects, 67 Fed. Reg.
80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002) [hereinafter NSR Simplification Rule] (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51,
52).
359. Id. at 80,189. Interestingly, the rule left in place the WEPCO Rule, which limited
power plants to the five years preceding the change. Id.; Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at
1698 n.119.
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virtually identical to the test that the WEPCO Rule had adopted for
360
The agency did not eliminate the demand growth
power plants.
discount in calculating future actual emissions as it had proposed in
361
As a practical matter, the operator’s ability to pick and
1998.
choose baseline years and to make optimistic projections of future
demand growth greatly reduced the universe of changes that would
362
be subject to NSR.
Third, the rule allowed sources to establish plantwide
applicability limits (“PALs”) that allowed them to avoid NSR so long
as any changes to equipment within a plant that increased actual
emissions were accompanied by other changes that brought about
363
offsetting decreases in actual emissions within the same plant. The
PAL could be determined on the basis of any consecutive two-year
364
Since the PAL was renewable for
period in the previous ten years.
another ten years if the source was emitting at eighty percent of its
365
PAL or higher, the new rule effectively rewarded sources that did
little to reduce emissions. Fourth, the rule provided a shield from
NSR for “Clean Units” that had already undergone NSR and were
366
The rule went a step further,
therefore subject to BACT or LAER.
however, to allow units that had not undergone NSR to qualify as a
clean unit if they had installed emissions control technology
comparable to BACT or LAER technology within the previous ten
367
Fifth, the rule created a new list of environmentally
years.
beneficial technologies that qualified as pollution control projects
368
and were therefore exempt from NSR.
The rule allowed the source to conclude that NSR was
inapplicable to a project if there was not a “reasonable possibility” that
the change would trigger NSR, but the rule did not specify how the
369
Nor did the
source would go about making that determination.
rule require companies to keep records supporting that

360. NSR Simplification Rule, supra note 358, at 80,198; John Boyd, Note, The New New
Source Review: Teaching Old Sources New Tricks? 11 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 401, 411–12 (2003).
361. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1698 n.123.
362. Id. at 1699; Boyd, supra note 360, at 411. Therefore, according to GAO, “under
the rule, some estimates of expected emissions most likely w[ould] be smaller than in the
past. GAO, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS, supra note 178, at 24.
363. NSR Simplification Rule, supra note 358, at 80,189; Boyd, supra note 360, at 413.
364. NSR Simplification Rule, supra note 358, at 80,208.
365. Id. at 80,209–10; Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1700.
366. NSR Simplification Rule, supra note 358, at 80,189; Boyd, supra note 360, at 414.
367. NSR Simplification Rule, supra note 358, at 80,190
368. Id.
369. GAO, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS, supra note 178, at 21.
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370

determination. Many state and local air pollution control agencies
were concerned that this “self-policing” aspect of the rule would make
371
Nine northeastern states and several
enforcement very difficult.
372
In
environmental groups challenged the rule in the D.C. Circuit.
June 2005, the court upheld all but a few relatively minor aspects of
373
the rule.
374
On the last day of 2002, EPA published its safe-harbor proposal.
The agency proposed two approaches to defining a bright-line test for
inclusion of a project within the RMRR exemption. Under the first
approach, a project would fall within the RMRR exemption if its total
costs did not exceed an annual maintenance, repair and replacement
allowance (expressed as a prescribed percentage of the unit’s
375
replacement cost), even if it resulted in an increase in emissions. If
the project exceeded the allowance, it could still come within the
376
Under the
RMRR exemption under the five-factor WEPCO test.
second approach, a project designed to replace existing equipment
with equipment that served the same function and did not alter the
unit’s basic design would come within the RMRR exemption if its cost
did not exceed a specified cost threshold (expressed as a percentage
of the fixed capital cost of rebuilding a comparable new unit), even if
377
it resulted in an increase in emissions.
The proposal encountered a storm cloud of opposition from
environmental groups, state air control agencies, and attorneys
378
Thousands of modifications that
general from downwind states.
were clearly covered by the statute would be exempted, they argued,
379
and ancient facilities would escape NSR in perpetuity. Many of the

370. Id. at 25.
371. Id.
372. Boyd, supra note 360, at 401; Steve Cook, EPA Issues Changes to Enforcement Program;
Nine States File Lawsuit to Block Final Rule, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 5 (Jan. 3, 2003).
373. New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 10–11 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also John H. Stam, Court
Mostly Upholds Rule Issued in 2002 Revising Provisions on Plant Modifications, 36 ENV’T REP.
(BNA) 1337 (July 1, 2005).
374. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-attainment New Source
Review (NSR): Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,290,
80,290 (Dec. 31, 2002) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52).
375. Id. at 80,294.
376. Id. at 80,293–94.
377. Id. at 80,295–96, 80,301.
378. See, e.g., Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 604 (statement of John Walke,
NRDC) (characterizing the Safe Harbor Rule as “the most sweeping and aggressive attack
that the Clean Air Act has faced in its thirty-year history”); Cook, Relaxed Requirements, supra
note 350 (citing John Walke, NRDC).
379. Nash & Revesz, supra note 22, at 1703–04.
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positions that the agency was taking in the proposal directly
repudiated the positions that the agency was taking in the NSR
380
They were confident that “wily and sophisticated”
litigation.
industry lawyers would “read the writing on the wall” and either delay
or terminate the ongoing settlement negotiations in the NSR
381
It was “a shame to see the administration directly
litigation.
undercutting career prosecutors at the Department of Justice, who
382
have a very strong case proving a pattern of violation industry-wide.”
The electric utility industry supported the proposed revisions as a
383
“critical first step” toward NSR reform. They agreed with the agency
that the rules would “create certainty and remove complexity and
384
Indeed, they claimed, the rule would benefit the
delay.”
environment by allowing sources to proceed ahead with pollution
385
control and efficiency-enhancing projects more expeditiously. They
criticized the agency for not making the rule immediately effective so
as to provide defendants in the NSR enforcement actions with a
386
strong argument that their lawsuits should be dismissed.
The final rule that EPA published on October 27, 2003 allowed
companies to replace components of a process unit with
identical components or their functional equivalents . . . ,
provided the cost of replacing the component [fell] below
20 percent of the replacement value of the process unit . . . ,
the replacement d[id] not change the unit’s basic design
parameters, and the unit continue[d] to meet enforceable

380. Cook, Relaxed Requirements, supra note 350 (citing John Walke, NRDC).
381. Pamela Najor, EPA Reform Proposal to Trigger Lawsuits, New York Official, Environmental Groups Say, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1311 (June 14, 2002).
382. Id. (quoting David Wooley, Clean Air Task Force).
383. Kenneth W. Betz, New Source Review Revisions Fail to Satisfy, ENERGY USER NEWS, Jan.
1, 2003, at 1; see also Steve Cook, Comments on Plant Modification Rules Sharply Disagree on Environmental Impacts, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2006 (Sept. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Cook, Comments] (“‘[The rule] finally produced much-needed NSR reforms.’” (quoting the National
Association of Manufacturers)); Gerald B. Silverman, New York Officials Lead Opposition;
Power Firms Say Rule Will “Create Certainty,” 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 774 (Apr. 4, 2003).
384. Silverman, supra note 383; see also Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 619
(statement of Donald Elliott, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker) (supporting the new NSR
rules but lamenting that they did not go far enough to clear the “[m]assive uncertainty”
created by “EPA’s misguided NSR enforcement”).
385. Cook, Comments, supra note 383.
386. See, e.g., Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 619–20 (statement of Donald
Elliott, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker).
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emission and operational limitations [in the source’s
387
permit].
The rule defined “functionally equivalent” to preclude changes in the
“basic design parameters” of the affected unit, but not to preclude
388
changes that enhanced the efficiency of the unit. The replacement
could result in an increase in emissions, so long as the increase did
not cause the unit to exceed any legally enforceable emissions
389
limitation or operational limitation otherwise applicable to the unit.
D. Inconsistent Enforcement of the Existing Rules
At the same time that it was supporting EPA’s efforts to
promulgate the NSR Simplification and Safe Harbor rules, the
industry and its allies were putting pressure on the Bush
390
At the staff level,
administration to dismiss the pending lawsuits.
however, EPA was continuing to assemble new cases for
391
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and
prosecution.
Compliance Assurance John Peter Suarez initially told the press that
the agency was vigorously prosecuting existing cases and building new
392
cases against violators of the old rules. The enforcement effort was,
however, hampered by staff reductions required by Bush
393
Citing resource limitations, DOJ
administration budget cuts.
agreed to stay cases against Georgia Power and Alabama Power for
394
several years.
Then, in November 2003, Suarez announced that he had
instructed the EPA staff to refrain from bringing new enforcement

387. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source
Review (NSR): Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair
and Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248, 61,251 (Oct. 27, 2003) (codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 51 and 52) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Rule].
388. Id. at 61,253.
389. Id. at 61,252.
390. See, e.g., Editorial, Rescuing the Clean Air Act, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2002, at A16 (criticizing Administrator Whitman for continuing to pursue lawsuits based on the Clinton
administration’s “bizarre” interpretation of the Clean Air Act even after taking a position
in the rulemaking that contradicted the government’s position in the lawsuits).
391. Steve Cook, EPA Requesting Information from Utilities as Part of Ongoing Enforcement
Program, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 6 (Jan. 3, 2003); Mike Ferullo, EPA Pursuing New Source Review Violations Amidst Efforts to Revise Rules, Official Says, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2261 (Oct. 18,
2002).
392. Ferullo, supra note 391.
393. Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84, at 3–4; Senate Public Health Hearings, supra note
229, at 35 (statement of Eric Schaeffer, former director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, EPA).
394. Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84, at 5.
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actions against companies for modifications that violated existing
regulations but did not violate the rules as amended by the NSR
395
Suarez had reluctantly
Simplification and Safe Harbor rules.
concluded that the two regulations represented more than a mere
policy change; they represented “a fundamental change in NSR
enforcement and interpretation that harmed OECA’s enforcement of
396
He instructed the staff, however, to press ahead
NSR violations.”
397
with the cases that the Justice Department had already filed.
Following that announcement, OECA abandoned ongoing
investigations into seventy suspected violators of the old NSR rules,
and it ceased work on forty-seven cases for which it had already issued
398
An EPA enforcement official
notices of violation to the sources.
concluded that under the twenty-percent safe harbor, “almost
399
The Justice
everything we worked to achieve is wiped out.”
Department’s environmental enforcement division, now headed by a
400
former lobbyist for the coal industry, likewise abandoned claims
401
under the pre-amendment versions of the RMRR regulations. The
Justice Department filed only three lawsuits against energy companies
during the first three years of the George W. Bush administration,
402
The agency’s
down ninety percent from the previous three years.
clear lack of concern for the pending cases precipitated an exodus of
403
Two of the high-level career
experienced enforcement attorneys.
employees who departed said that they had warned Administrator
Whitman that the rule changes would undermine the pending cases,

395. Steve Cook, EPA Asked to Provide Enforcement Files on Cases Dropped Because of New
Rules, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2478 (Nov. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Cook, Cases Dropped].
396. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NEW SOURCE REVIEW RULE
CHANGE HARMS EPA’S ABILITY TO ENFORCE AGAINST COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES 11
(Sept. 30, 2004) [hereinafter OIG, NSR REPORT].
397. Mike Ferullo, EPA’s Compliance Chief Defends Review of Existing New Source Review Investigations, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2583 (Nov. 28, 2003).
398. Cook, Cases Dropped, supra note 395; see also, e.g., Eric Pianin, EPA Rule Revisions Roil
U.S. Case Against Power Plant, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2003, at A8 [hereinafter Pianin, Rule Revisions] (explaining how the change affected the government’s case against a facility operated by Dynegy Midwest Generation Inc.).
399. Barcott, supra note 166, at 77.
400. People: Thomas L. Sansonetti, HOLLAND & HART, http://www.hollandhart.com/
tlsansonetti/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
401. Pianin, Rule Revisions, supra note 398.
402. Steve Cook, Antipollution Lawsuits Down by 75 Percent During Bush Administration,
Report Says, 35 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2141 (Oct. 15, 2004).
403. Jennifer 8. Lee, 3 Top Enforcement Officials Say They Will Leave E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2004, at A20.
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404

but they were overruled. According to one career employee, “[t]he
405
rug was pulled out from under us.”
The agency persisted in its new enforcement policy even after the
406
This
D.C. Circuit in late December stayed the Safe Harbor Rule.
was, of course, precisely the outcome that the coal-burning utilities
had desired when they were vigorously lobbying the agency to amend
the NSR rules. Outraged environmental groups charged the agency
with shirking a major responsibility by not prosecuting companies
407
They also
that violated the rules that were in effect at the time.
noted that since the new rules would not become effective for up to
three years in most states, the agency was effectively giving scofflaws a
get-out-of-jail-free pass for ongoing violations of the rules that
408
The
remained in effect until the Safe Harbor Rule was finalized.
state attorneys general who were also parties to the lawsuit vowed to
pursue the existing cases to completion, with or without EPA, and
409
they asked DOJ to make the government’s files available to them.
The criticism had an impact on newly arrived EPA Administrator
Michael Leavitt.
Less than three months after Suarez’s
announcement, Leavitt announced that EPA would continue to
initiate enforcement actions against owners of plants that violated the
410
old rules. Leavitt told the enforcement staff that “enforcement is an
411
Soon
essential part of our mission, and we will enforce the law.”
thereafter, in late January 2004, the Justice Department filed the first
new NSR enforcement case against a power plant since the onset of
412
To defuse criticism during the election
the Bush administration.
season, the agency “abruptly took a tougher approach to the utility
industry” and warned of new lawsuits if plants did not clean up in
413
anticipation of the new policies. In one major settlement, an Ohio
404. Drew & Oppel, supra note 309.
405. Id.
406. Katharine Q. Seelye & Jennifer 8. Lee, Court Blocks U.S. Effort to Relax Pollution Rule,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2003, at A1.
407. Joe Truini, States May Act If EPA Drops Probes, WASTE NEWS, Nov. 10, 2003, at 1.
408. Id.
409. Cook, Cases Dropped, supra note 395; Sherie Winston & Thomas F. Armistead, EPA
Moves Away from Enforcement, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Nov. 17, 2003, at 12.
410. David McIntosh, Airy Conspiracy: NRDC Accuses Utilities of Collusion to Violate Air
Quality Standards, ENERGY, Jan. 1, 2004, at 38.
411. Eric Pianin, Justice Dept. Sues Ky. Utility for Breach of Clean Air Act, WASH. POST, Jan.
29, 2004, at A2 [hereinafter Pianin, DOJ Sues Ky.].
412. Id.; EPA Cracking Whip Again, Strikes Blow Against EKPC Coal Burners, U.S. COAL
REV., Feb. 2, 2004.
413. Eric Pianin, Bush Moves to Defuse Environmental Criticism, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2004,
at A5.
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utility company agreed to pay $1.1 billion in fines and pollution
414
controls for four of its power plants.
E. The Hourly Emissions Rule (August 31, 2005)
After the 2004 elections returned George W. Bush to the White
House, EPA unveiled more deregulatory initiatives designed to
reduce the impact of the NSR program on power plants. First on the
list was a new “Hourly Emissions” rule. As we have seen, EPA’s new
source performance standards were stated in units of kilograms per
hour, whereas the NSR regulations were stated in tons per year
because the thresholds in the PSD and nonattainment provisions of
415
the 1977 Amendments for “majorness” were stated in tons per year.
In the government’s lawsuit against Duke Energy, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the company that a source did not have to undergo NSR
for projects that increased annual emissions if they did not increase
416
But the state attorneys general and
hourly emissions.
environmental groups who brought the Duke Energy challenge
417
appealed to the Supreme Court, and the D.C. Circuit had reached
418
the opposite result in an earlier case. The agency hoped to render
the case moot by amending the NSR regulations to shift the focus to
419
As with the other rules easing the NSR
hourly emissions.
restrictions, EPA explained that the Clean Air Interstate Rule
(“CAIR”) would more than offset any emissions increases attributable
420
to moving to the hourly emissions approach.

414. Ohio Utility to Pay $1 Billion in Pollution Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2005, at A7.
415. PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 10; 1992 Implementation Plan Rules, supra
note 34, at 32,316.
416. United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 550–51 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated
sub nom. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
417. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 547 U.S. 1127 (2006) (granting certiorari).
418. New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit later wrote
an opinion that agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s position. United States v. Cinergy Corp.,
458 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir. 2006).
419. Steven D. Cook, EPA Moving Forward with Rulemaking to Ease Pollution Controls for
Large Plants, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1813 (Sept. 9, 2005).
420. Id.; Dean Scott, EPA Proposes Hourly Emissions Tests for Measuring Increases After Modifications, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2093 (Oct. 14, 2005) (quoting EPA Administrator Stephen
Johnson as stating that more uniform emissions testing under new NSR regulations “will
encourage installation of new, innovative technologies that promote greater energy emissions efficiency and reliability at our nation’s plants”).
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Although it would take another two years for EPA to publish a
421
notice of proposed rulemaking, the radical shift in policy affected
the ongoing litigation. In the Duke Energy case, the Solicitor General
filed a brief with the Supreme Court opposing review of the Fourth
422
The brief noted that EPA was considering
Circuit decision.
revisions to the NSR regulations that would render the Fourth Circuit
423
More important, Deputy
opinion “of limited practical import.”
Administrator Marcus Peacock ordered OECA to stop working on
potential new cases that involved violations of the annual emissions
NSR rule along with cases that involved projects that would have come
424
within the twenty-percent safe harbor. The memo noted that other
“rulemakings, particularly CAIR, will reduce power plant emissions
deeper, faster, and more efficiently than would be achieved by
continuing costly and uncertain litigation in case-by-case enforcement
425
This, of course, assumed that
actions of existing . . . regulations.”
the rules would go into effect expeditiously. After the memo issued,
the flow of NSR enforcement actions slowed to a trickle. During
426
2007, DOJ filed only two NSR cases against the utility companies.
Another immediate effect of the Peacock memo was to inspire
companies that had taken the same position as Duke Power in the
427
NSR litigation to file motions to dismiss the lawsuits.

421. Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review: Emissions Increases for Electric Generating Units, 72 Fed. Reg. 26,202 (May 8, 2007).
422. Steven D. Cook, Government Opposes Supreme Court Review of Appeals Court Ruling in
Duke Energy Case, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 544 (Mar. 17, 2006).
423. Id.
424. Steven D. Cook, Power Company Seeks Stay of Lawsuit Pending Separate Ruling, Proposed
Rule, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2288 (Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Cook, Stay of Lawsuit]; Tom
Tiernan, New-Source Ruling Leaves Utilities Seeking New Law, Other Side Hoping for Enforcement,
ELEC. UTIL. WK., Mar. 27, 2006, at 1.
425. Juliet Eilperin, EPA Joins Settlement of Lawsuit but Adds a Waiver, WASH. POST, Oct.
11, 2007, at A3 (alteration in original) (quoting the Peacock memo); see also Steven D.
Cook, Effect of New Source Review Decision Limited by EPA Policy, Proposed Rule, 37 ENV’T REP.
(BNA) 662 (Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Cook, Effect Limited] (quoting the Peacock memo
as instructing investigators to focus on other areas “that will likely produce significant environmental benefits”); Cook, Stay of Lawsuit, supra note 424 (quoting the Peacock memo as
stating that “other EPA anti-pollution programs will make greater emissions cuts faster
than new source review and be more cost-effective”).
426. Michael Bologna, Midwest Generation, Commonwealth Edison Hit for Alleged New Source
Review Violations, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1709 (Aug. 10, 2007); Steven D. Cook, EPA Announces Plans to File Cases Against Utilities Lacking Modern Controls, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 718
(Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Cook, EPA Announces Plans]; Michael Hawthorne, EPA Cites
Coal Plants, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2007, at A1.
427. AEP, Cinergy Seek Dismissal of EPA Lawsuits in Light of Agency’s New Proposed Rules for
NSR, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Nov. 14, 2005, at 14.
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In a quixotic effort to demonstrate that it had not abandoned
NSR enforcement altogether, OECA in April 2006 sent letters to three
companies asking for more information about recent maintenance
428
Eric Schaeffer, now of the Environmental
and repair projects.
Integrity Project, gave the OECA staff credit because, like the
429
Scott Segal of the Electric
Energizer bunny, they kept on trying.
Reliability Coordinating Council hoped that the letters did not
represent a change in policy, noting that the CAIR “probably
pushe[d] most facilities beyond where NSR settlements would be
430
That conclusion was supported by a July
expected in any event.”
2006 report by the National Academy of Sciences’ National Research
Council, which concluded that by the time that CAIR was fully
implement in twelve years, the emissions reductions from old power
plants required by that rule would largely offset the additional
431
This
emissions allowed by the changes to the NSR program.
assessment, too, assumed that CAIR would in fact go into effect and
be fully enforced.
During oral argument before the Supreme Court in November
2006, the government switched gears and sided with the
432
environmental groups and downwind state attorneys general.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked the DOJ lawyer how its position
was consistent with the fact that EPA would now allow Duke to avoid
433
He replied that the hourly
NSR under an hourly emissions test.
434
emissions proposal was just that—a proposal. Justice Antonin Scalia
interjected that companies could get “whipsawed” by EPA’s
435
inconsistent positions.
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court unanimously held that EPA
could properly employ an annual emissions test for determining
whether a project qualified for NSR and an hourly test for
determining whether the new source performance standards applied
436
The Fourth Circuit’s construction
to a change to an existing unit.
428. Steven D. Cook, EPA Letters to Three Power Companies Seek Information on Possible Violations, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 998 (May 12, 2006).
429. Id. [sic].
430. Id.
431. Steven D. Cook, Impact of Changes to Enforcement Program Offset by EPA’s Interstate
Rule, Report Says, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1555 (July 28, 2006).
432. Charles Lane, Justices Challenge EPA’s Arguments in Clean Air Act Case, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2006, at A10.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 564, 573–76 (2007).
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of the NSR regulations to conform to the NSPS regulations was simply
437
Environmental groups were pleased with their
not permissible.
victory but warned that EPA still had an agenda to “abolish the NSR
438
program altogether for the benefit of the utility sector.” EPA called
439
the decision “an important victory for EPA,” but it made it clear that
it would proceed with its proposal to adopt an hourly standard for
440
NSR.
Later that month, EPA published the long-awaited notice of
441
proposed rulemaking for the Hourly Rate Rule. The proposed rule
would have allowed sources to avoid NSR if a modification did not
increase the hourly rate of emissions, even if it increased annual
emissions because it allowed the plant to operate for more hours
442
If the hourly emissions increased, the agency
during the year.
443
Only if
would then examine whether annual emissions increased.
both hourly and annual emissions increased would the source have to
444
The agency said that the Supreme Court’s Duke
undergo NSR.
445
EPA
Energy opinion did not affect the rulemaking in any way.
predicted that CAIR would more than make up for any emissions
446
increases due to the move to hourly emissions.
F. The Demise of the Safe Harbor Rule
Two major assumptions underlying the Peacock memo were that
the agency would in fact promulgate the Hourly Rate Rule and that
the Safe Harbor Rule would survive judicial review. The second
premise disappeared when, on March 17, 2006, the D.C. Circuit
vacated the rule because it so clearly departed from the plain

437. Id. at 577.
438. Brian Hansen, EPA to Proceed on NSR Rule Despite Court Decision, INSIDE ENERGY
WITH FED. LANDS, Apr. 9, 2007, at 1; see also Cook, EPA to Proceed, supra note 237 (quoting
several leaders of environmental advocacy groups expressing support for the Supreme
Court decision in Duke Energy).
439. Hansen, supra note 438.
440. Cook, EPA to Proceed, supra note 237; Stam, Duke Energy Case, supra note 216.
441. Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review: Emissions Increases for Electric Generating Units, 72 Fed. Reg. 26,202 (May 8, 2007).
442. Steven D. Cook, EPA Proposes to Narrow Definition of “Emissions Increase” for Power
Plants, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 949 (Apr. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Cook, Narrow Definition].
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. EPA’s New NSR Rule Features Hourly Emissions Test, But Based on “Output,” ELEC.
UTIL. WK. Apr. 30, 2007, at 4.
446. Cook, Narrow Definition, supra note 442.
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meaning of the statutory definition of “modification.”
The court
found that the words “any physical change” in that definition were
448
The
unambiguous and clearly included equipment replacements.
court agreed with the environmental groups that Congress’s use of
the modifier “any” demonstrated that the term “physical change”
included “any activity at a source that could be considered a physical
449
change that increases emissions.” In a rather gratuitous slam on the
agency, the court noted that “[o]nly in a Humpty Dumpty world
would Congress be required to use superfluous words while an agency
450
could ignore an expansive word that Congress did use.” The agency
was empowered to exclude activities that resulted in de minimis
amounts of emissions, but the emissions permitted by the twenty451
percent safe harbor were hardly trivial.
The decision did not affect many ongoing projects, because the
industry had complied with the old rules after the court stayed the
452
The industry complained, however, that
Safe Harbor Rule.
continuing uncertainty over EPA’s case-by-case application of the
WEPCO factors would have a “chilling effect” on investments in
453
The court’s decision therefore lent
maintenance and repair.
urgency to the efforts in Congress to enact NSR amendments to the
454
Clean Air Act. Because it was an election year and the Republican
majorities in both houses were at considerable risk, it was not a good
time to push through legislation that environmental activists would
455
characterize as a free pass for polluters.
Environmental groups and downwind state attorneys general
were delighted with the holding. New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer predicted that it would “encourage industry to build new and
456
cleaner facilities, instead of prolonging the life of old, dirty plants.”
Industry lawyers, however, urged the agency to exercise its
enforcement discretion to continue to allow projects that fell within
457
the twenty-percent safe harbor. EPA declined that invitation and, in
447. New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
448. Id. at 884.
449. Id. at 885.
450. Id. at 887.
451. Id. at 883, 888.
452. Cook, Effect Limited, supra note 425; Tiernan, supra note 424.
453. Tiernan, supra note 424 (quoting Dan Riedinger, Edison Electric Institute).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Juliet Eilperin, Looser Emission Rules Rejected, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006, at A1.
457. Cook, Narrow Definition, supra note 442 (citing Kevin Gaynor, attorney, Vinson &
Elkins).
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late May 2008, it did not renew the Peacock memo.
Soon
thereafter, the director of EPA’s air enforcement division announced
that it was currently investigating ten to twenty power companies for
459
possible violations of the NSR regulations.
G. Effect of the Rulemaking Activities on the Ongoing Litigation
Whether EPA’s NSR rulemaking initiatives had an adverse effect
on the ongoing NSR litigation was a matter of some debate at the
time. The head of the DOJ environmental enforcement division
denied that the regulations had any impact on the ongoing
settlement negotiations, but he acknowledged that whether they
would affect the outcomes of the cases going to trial would depend on
460
A senior DOJ attorney who was familiar with the
the judges.
litigation predicted that the ten utility companies that were subject to
the outstanding lawsuits at the outset of the Bush administration were
unlikely to settle, and, if they did, the settlements would most likely be
461
on terms dictated by the rules that were in effect at the time.
The upper level politically appointed officials at EPA who were
responsible for promulgating the rules steadfastly denied that they
462
Then-Assistant
would have any impact on the litigation.
Administrator for Air and Radiation Jeffrey Holmstead testified that
the impact of the NSR Simplification and Safe Harbor rules on the
ongoing litigation was “one of the primary issues that was discussed”
at meetings attended by EPA and DOJ attorneys, and they did “not
believe these changes w[ould] have a negative impact on the
463
enforcement cases.”
This account, however, was inconsistent with the position of
464
A June 2002
OECA during the internal agency deliberations.
458. Andrew Childers, Annual Actual Emissions Standard Test for New Source Review Reinstated by EPA, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1045 (May 30, 2008).
459. Steven D. Cook, EPA Says Violations of New Source Review by Power Plants Top Enforcement Priority, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 303 (Feb. 15, 2008).
460. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 32–33, 101 (statement of Thomas Sansonetti, Assistant Att’y Gen., Environment and Resources Division, DOJ).
461. Elizabeth Shogren, Administration Sticking with Clinton Pollution Suit, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2002, at A14.
462. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 30, 34 (statement of Jeffrey Holmstead,
Assistant Adm’r for Air and Radiation, EPA); Cook, Relaxed Requirements, supra note 350
(reporting EPA Administrator Christie Todd Whitman’s intention not to “relent” in pursuing the lawsuits despite the rule changes).
463. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 34.
464. OIG, NSR REPORT, supra note 396, at 12, tbl.2.1 (detailing differences between
EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation and its Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance); Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 75, at 71 (statement of Eric Schaeffer, Dir.,
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memorandum written by Sylvia K. Lowrance, a deputy assistant
administrator in OECA, warned that the changes effectuated by the
NSR Simplification and Safe Harbor rules would “undermine” the
465
EPA officials who were directly
ongoing enforcement litigation.
involved in the NSR enforcement initiative from its inception warned
that the rule changes were having a devastating impact on the
466
One dejected EPA enforcement officer
settlement negotiations.
who had been with the agency since its inception decided to retire out
of frustration at seeing “some or our significant advances taken
467
A report by the agency’s Inspector General concluded that
away.”
the proposed NSR changes had “seriously hampered” the agency’s
“settlement activities, existing enforcement cases, and the
468
development of future cases.”
As discussed above, two major companies, Cinergy and Dominion
walked away from settlement negotiations in which they had already
entered into agreements in principle with the government to spend a
469
total of about $1.9 billion on additional pollution controls.
According to Eric Schaeffer, who was present at the negotiations,
“[t]hey put their tons of pollution on the table, they shook hands with
470
us,” and then EPA proposed to change the underlying regulations.
Two years later, in April 2003, Dominion agreed to a settlement with
EPA and five states that was virtually identical to the earlier agreement
471
in principle. By contrast, Cinergy never returned to the settlement
table, preferring instead to litigate every conceivable issue in a long
472
and drawn out war of attrition that lasted for more than a decade.
Environmental Integrity Project) (“Enforcement has consistently expressed concern about
some of these changes and their impact on the cases.”).
465. Elizabeth Shogren, EPA Official Backed Air Act Changes Despite Warnings, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2003, at A33.
466. Letter from Eric V. Schaeffer to Christine Whitman (Feb. 28, 2002).
467. Barcott, supra note 166 (quoting Rich Biondi, Associate Director, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA).
468. OIG, NSR REPORT, supra note 396, at ii.
469. Eric Schaeffer, Clearing the Air: Why I Quit Bush’s EPA, WASH. MONTHLY, July 1,
2002, at 20; Eric Pianin, U.S. Presses Utilities on Pollution Settlements, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
2002, at A5; Perez-Pena, supra note 200.
470. Pianin & Morgan, supra note 296. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, whose
office was also part of the settlement negotiations, agreed with Schaeffer. Senate NSR Policy
Hearings, supra note 75, at 172 (statement of Eliot Spitzer, Att’y Gen., New York).
471. Jaber, supra note 53, at 27–28 (providing a detailed account of the terms of the
settlement); Mike Ferullo & Steve Cook, Virginia Electric Utility Will Spend $1.2 Billion to Cut
Air Pollution From Eight Power Plants, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 925 (Apr. 25, 2003); Jennifer 8.
Lee, Utility to Spend $1.2 Billion to Cut Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2003, at A9.
472. Steve Cook, Government, Cinergy Unlikely to Reach Settlement of Litigation, Company
Says, 35 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 529 (Mar. 12, 2004).
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The companies made effective use of the NSR Simplification and
473
According to Eric Schaeffer,
Safe Harbor rules in the litigation.
attorneys for TVA “walked right into court” in the pending Eleventh
Circuit litigation and “waved a copy of the proposed changes, and said
very clearly that the court should consider putting off or postponing
hearing the case or making a decision because the government was
474
In another case,
still making its mind up as to what the law was.”
the government was forced to concede that the Clean Air Act did not
require a narrow interpretation of the RMRR exemption when
confronted with the agency’s own contemplated changes in the Safe
475
In still another case, the defendant argued that
Harbor proposal.
“EPA now admits what is obvious: Industry . . . has not been provided
476
One district
ascertainable certainty regarding what is ‘routine.’”
court concluded that “[g]iven EPA’s zigs and zags . . . the court
cannot say that EPA’s interpretation of its rules is due to be
477
The changes also affected litigation filed
afforded . . . deference.”
by environmental groups and state attorneys general in which EPA
478
Cinergy even argued that the government’s
did not participate.
479
lawyers should be sanctioned for bringing the case in the first place.
H. NSR Enforcement During the Bush Administration
By the end of the George W. Bush administration, it was clear
that its on-again-off-again approach to NSR enforcement had resulted
in: a number of important settlements of the cases that DOJ had
initiated at the end of the Clinton administration; a few new cases
473. OIG, NSR REPORT, supra note 396, at ii; Tiernan, supra note 424; Cook, Stay of
Lawsuit, supra note 424; Tripp Baltz, Xcel Energy Said to Violate Pollution Rules at Two CoalFired Power Plants in Colorado, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1538 (July 12, 2002); Utility Cites New
Source Review Proposal in Bid to Dismiss Government’s Lawsuit, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 175 (Jan.
24, 2003).
474. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 75, at 71 (statement of Eric Schaeffer, Director, Environmental Integrity Project).
475. Cook, Whitman Warned, supra note 308 (citing Eric Schaeffer, Director, Environmental Integrity Project); see also Pianin, Rule Revisions, supra note 398 (describing the incident). The move impelled the Illinois Attorney General to file a motion to intervene in
the case to argue the government’s original position that the exemption had to be narrowly construed. Id.
476. Utility Cites New Source Review Proposal in Bid to Dismiss Government’s Lawsuit, 34
ENV’T REP. (BNA) 175 (Jan. 24, 2003).
477. Steven D. Cook, Federal Court in Alabama Deals Setback to EPA in Case Against Power
Company, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1165 (June 10, 2005) [hereinafter Cook, Alabama Court].
478. Eric Pianin, Bush Plan to Ease Clean Air Rules Roils Court Cases Against Utilities, WASH.
POST, July 16, 2002, at A2.
479. Brian Hansen, Utilities Press Court to Throw out NSR Lawsuits Brought by Clinton EPA,
INSIDE ENERGY WITH FED. LANDS, Nov. 14, 2005, at 8.
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(mostly during the first term and near the end of the second term),
most of which were still in litigation at the end of the administration;
and a few major trials in the holdover cases from the Clinton
administration. Unwilling to trust the administration to bring and
vigorously prosecute NSR enforcement actions, several environmental
groups filed citizen enforcement actions against several companies for
NSR violations.
1. Settlements
EPA’s perennial problem of lack of enforcement resources made
settlements far more attractive than full-scale litigation, and the cuts
to the agency’s enforcement budget during the George W. Bush years
480
made things even worse. The point of the exercise was not so much
to extract large fines from the companies as it was to force them
either to install the modern technologies that they should have
481
The agency’s
employed years ago or to retire the old plants.
settlement negotiations were, as discussed above, affected by the
changes to the NSR program that the agency was attempting to
implement through rulemaking in response to Vice President
482
Cheney’s Energy Task Force.
In late 2001 and early 2002, EPA entered into a series of
settlements with owners of major oil refineries, a major paper
company, a major coal company, a major aluminum company, and
483
The public utility companies
the owner of fifty-two ethanol plants.
were not as anxious to settle as companies in the other industries, but
fifteen electric utility companies over the course of the George W.
480. Barcott, supra note 166 (settlements); Buckheit Testimony, supra note 84, at 3–4
(budget cuts).
481. Barcott, supra note 166.
482. See supra Part V.B.
483. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 97 (statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Environment and Natural Resources Division, DOJ) (discussing the
settlement with paper company Boise Cascade); Steve Cook, Two Companies Will Spend $685
Million to Cut More Than 100,000 Tons of Pollution, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 797 (Apr. 11,
2003) (discussing the settlements with Alcoa (coal plant) and Archer Daniels Midland
(ethanol plants)); Steve Cook, Notices to Refineries Said to Indicate EPA Enforcement Actions
Moving Forward, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 7 (Jan. 4, 2002) (discussing settlements with refinery
operators Conoco, Navajo Refining, and Montana Refining); Pamela Najor, Refiners Will
Install $400 Million in Controls to Settle Alleged Violations at Nine Facilities, 32 ENV’T REP.
(BNA) 589 (Mar. 30, 2001) (discussing settlements with refinery operators Motiva Enterprises, Equilon Enterprises, and Deer Park Refining); John H. Stam, Marathon Ashland to
Pay $265 Million for Pollution Control at Seven Refineries, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 961 (May 18,
2001) (discussing the settlement with refinery operator Marathon Ashland); Murphy Oil to
Pay $13 Million to Resolve Allegations at Northern Wisconsin Refinery, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 223
(Feb. 1, 2002) (discussing the settlement with oil refiner Murphy Oil).
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Bush administration entered into major settlements in which they
agreed to pay a total of $57,450,000 in fines, spend $224,450,000 on
supplemental projects, and invest $11,127,000,000 in pollution
control equipment at 174 units with a predicted reduction in SO2
emissions of 1,288,745 tons per year and in NOx emissions of 434,844
484
The largest settlement was an October 9, 2007
tons per year.
agreement with American Electric Power in which the company
agreed to pay a fine of $15 million, support supplementary
environmental projects worth $60 million, and spend $4.6 billion to
485
The settlement, which was the
clean up twenty-five power plants.
largest in EPA’s history, came at the end of a long trial but before the
486
The predicted SO2 emissions
judge had rendered a decision.
reductions from that single settlement exceeded the total SO2 emitted
487
by all sources in forty-five states.
All of the settlements contained similar features, including a
denial of liability by the defendants, retirement or installation of
control technologies on existing units, a prohibition on selling or
trading any excess emissions allowances from controls required by the
consent decrees (to ensure that the emissions reductions actually
occurred), relatively low fines, a requirement to invest in
supplemental environmental projects, and protection from future
488
NSR enforcement actions for a specified number of years.
Although the Bush administration took credit for these impressive
settlements, many of their benefits would have resulted if the
government had walked away from the lawsuits because state attorneys
general and environmental groups would have pursued them.
2. Cases That Went to Trial
The Justice Department and EPA also brought several of the
489
Those trials frequently revealed internal
pending cases to trial.
documents demonstrating that the companies were consciously
disregarding EPA guidance documents and letters that made it clear
484. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 30 app.III.
485. Steven D. Cook, AEP Settles Lawsuit Alleging Violations, Will Spend $4.6 Billion on
Emissions Cuts, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2165 (Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Cook, AEP Settles].
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Jaber, supra note 53, at 25–26.
489. See, e.g., Bebe Raupe, Modifications at Ohio Edison Plant Violated Clean Air Act Provisions, Federal Court Says, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1757 (Aug. 8, 2003) (discussing the 2003 case
brought against Ohio Edison); Christopher Brown, Federal Trial Opens in Clean Air Lawsuit
Alleging Violations by Illinois Electric Utility, 34 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1261 (June 6, 2003) (discussing the case brought by the EPA against Illinois Power Co.).
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490

that the projects at issue would trigger NSR.
The real motivation
491
The
appeared to be to avoid the cost of complying with the law.
Justice Department won several of these cases and in the process set
492
In some cases, however, DOJ lawyers
some important precedents.
were unable to convince courts and juries that the companies had
493
And in one case, the
engaged in unlawful life extension activities.
494
Seventh Circuit reversed a jury verdict for EPA on appeal.
3. Filing New Cases
EPA and DOJ brought only three new cases against power plants
during the George W. Bush administration, and one was simply to
gain judicial approval for an agreed-upon settlement. In January
2002, DOJ entered into a settlement with PSEG Power, a New Jersey
power company, for PSEG Power’s stated purpose of avoiding
495
expensive litigation. Two years later, DOJ filed the first full-fledged
enforcement action against East Kentucky Power Cooperative
claiming that the company had, on several occasions, modified coal496
The lawsuit was filed soon after
burning units at two plants.
Administrator Leavitt announced that the agency would take a
497
More than three years after
tougher approach to enforcement.
that, DOJ filed an enforcement action against Kentucky Utilities Co.
for violations occurring at its E.W. Brown power plant in Mercer
County, Kentucky. The violations were so egregious that they would
498
Frank
have violated both the Safe Harbor and Hourly Rate rules.
O’Donnell, the head of Clean Air Watch, observed near the end of

490. See, e.g., United States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1024 (S.D.
Ind. 2003).
491. See Barcott, supra note 166 (describing the “enormous” amount of money at stake
in these lawsuits).
492. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); United States v.
Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
493. See, e.g., Andrew Childers, Cinergy Cleared of 10 of 14 Charges That It Violated New
Source Review, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1048 (May 30, 2008); Steven D. Cook, U.S. Court Adopts
Electric Utilities’ View on Definition of “Routine Maintenance”, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1814 (Sept.
9, 2005); Cook, Alabama Court, supra note 477; Bob Matyi, Jurors Rule in Duke Energy’s Favor
on Four of Six Projects in Federal Clean Air Act Suit, ELEC. UTIL. WK., May 25, 2009, at 8.
494. Matthew Bandyk, Duke Energy Gets Victory on Appeal in Wabash River NSR Case, SNL
FERC POWER REP., Oct. 20, 2010.
495. John J. Fialka, PSEG Settles Accord to Settle Probe on Air Pollution, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25,
2002, at A14.
496. Steve Cook, Government Resumes Enforcement Actions Under Clean Air New Source Review Program, 35 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 197 (Jan. 30, 2004);
497. Pianin, DOJ sues Ky., supra note 411.
498. Cook, EPA Announces Plans, supra note 426.
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the Clinton administration that “the U.S. electric industry was
frantically on the run because federal enforcers were going after them
at every turn,” but “[t]hen the Bush administration called off the
499
dogs.”
4. State and Environmental Group Lawsuits
State attorneys general and environmental groups were far more
active than the Bush administration in filing lawsuits against power
plant operators for violating the NSR regulations, especially during
the times that EPA enforcers were not allowed to pursue cases that
did not involve violations of its Safe Harbor and Hourly Rate rules.
The citizen enforcement actions included the following:
NRG Energy (January 2002)—The State of New York sued NRG
Energy, Inc. for failing to undergo NSR with respect to more than fifty
projects undertaken over a seventeen-year period at two coal-burning
500
power plants near Buffalo.
Dayton Power & Light (July 2004)—The Sierra Club initiated the
process of suing Dayton Power & Light Co. following up on a notice
of violation that EPA issued in 2000 to the plant for failing to undergo
NSR after having engaged in major modifications at its Stuart Station
501
near Cincinnati.
Southwestern Electric Power (March 2005)—Several environmental
groups sued American Electric Power and its Southwestern Electric
Power Co. subsidiary alleging that the company had violated the NSR
502
regulations at its Welsh power plant near Pittsburg, Texas.
Allegheny Energy (June 2005)—Four northeastern states initiated
the process of suing Allegheny Energy, Inc. for projects that
significantly increased emissions at five West Virginia coal plants.
New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer found it “disturbing that the
503
federal government is no longer enforcing the Clean Air Act.”

499. Juliet Eilperin, EPA Joins Settlement of Lawsuit but Adds a Waiver, WASH. POST, Oct.
11, 2007, at A3.
500. Gerald B. Silverman, New York Sues Two Coal-Fired Power Plants over Alleged Clean Air
Violations, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 118 (Jan. 18, 2002).
501. Bebe Raupe, Sierra Club Notifies Utility of Plan to Sue over Unaddressed Clean Air Act
Violations, 35 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1630 (July 30, 2004).
502. Kurt Fernandez, Public Citizen, Sierra Club Take Large Utility to Court over East Texas
Plant Emissions, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 530 (Mar. 18, 2005).
503. Steve Cook, Four Northeastern States Plan to Sue over Pollution from West Virginia Power
Plants, 35 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1144 (May 28, 2004).
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Mirant (July 2005)—Four environmental groups filed notices of
intent to sue Mirant Corp. for NSR violations at its Dickerson power
504
plant in Montgomery County, Maryland.
Rochester Gas & Electric (October 2006)—The State of New York
sent a notice of intent to sue Rochester Gas & Electric for long505
standing violations of the NSR rules.
5. The Barack Obama Administration
The 2008 elections sent to the White House a dynamic young
president who had run on a platform of hope and change. 506 It also
507
increased the Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress.
Environmental groups and downwind state attorneys general had
every reason to believe that the new administration would aggressively
pursue the existing NSR enforcement cases, file many more new cases
against companies that continued to undertake life extension projects
without undergoing NSR, and withdraw or rescind the controversial
proposals of the Bush years. When President Obama appointed Lisa
Jackson, the aggressive Commissioner of New Jersey’s Department of
Environmental Protection, to be his EPA administrator, they were
508
delighted. Their hopes, however, were only partially fulfilled.
The Obama administration moved rapidly to reinvigorate the
NSR enforcement initiative that had gone moribund during the Bush
administration. On February 4, 2009, EPA and DOJ issued a joint
release announcing a new “national initiative, targeting electric
509
utilities whose coal-fired power plants violate the law.” In deciding
whether projects came within the RMMR exclusion, the agency
employed the WEPCO multi-factor test that it had employed prior to

504. Meredith Preston, Environmental Groups Allege Violations at Mirant Maryland Plant,
Threaten Lawsuit, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1553 (July 29, 2005).
505. Spitzer Targets Rochester Gas & Electric for Alleged Violations of Clean Air Laws, U.S.
COAL REV., Oct. 16, 2006.
506. Adam Nagourney, Obama Wins Election; McCain Loses as Bush Legacy is Rejected, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05
campaign.html?pagewanted=all.
507. Id.
508. Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, available at
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/administrator.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012); see also,
e.g., Press Release, Natural Resources Defense Council, Obama’s Appointments Signal a
New Approach to Environment and Energy for America (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2008/081215.asp.
509. Alexander Duncan, “Nervous” Utilities Brace for Clinton-Scale NSR Crackdown Against
Coal-Fired Plants, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Feb. 23, 2009, at 13.
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510

the promulgation and reversal of the Safe Harbor Rule.
An
attorney for utility companies said that it looked like government
511
prosecutors were “starting out where they left off in 2000.”
EPA followed up on the announcement with a raft of new
512
lawsuits. The first lawsuit was filed on the day of the announcement
against Westar Energy, Inc. alleging that it had engaged in major
modifications without undergoing NSR at its Jeffrey Energy Center in
513
Later that month, DOJ/EPA sued NRG Energy
St. Marys, Kansas.
for several major modifications it had undertaken at its Big Cajun 2
514
In March,
power plant in Louisiana without undergoing NSR.
DOJ/EPA sued American Municipal Power Corp. for violations at its
515
Five months later, DOJ/EPA
Gorsuch plant near Marietta, Ohio.
sued Midwest Generation alleging that it made numerous
516
modifications to six coal-burning power plants in Illinois.
At this point the initiative slowed, but did not come to a
complete stop. In August 2010, DOJ/EPA sued DTE Energy for NSR
517
violations at its Monroe power plant in Monroe, Michigan. In that
case, however, the court held that the company’s modifications were
not unlawful because they complied with the 2002 NSR Simplification
518
In January 2011, DOJ/EPA filed a lawsuit against Ameren
Rule.
Missouri for failing to comply with the NSR regulations at its Rush
519
Island coal-fired power plant. In some of these later filed cases, the
courts dismissed some or all of the claims for civil penalties because
the violations had occurred more than five years prior to the filing of

510. Glen Boshart, EPA Lists Curbing Smokestack Emissions as a Top 2011–2013 Enforcement
Goal, SNL FERC POWER REP., Mar. 3, 2010.
511. Duncan, supra note 509 (quoting Richard Alonso, Bracewell & Giuliani).
512. Id.
513. Andrew Childers, New Source Review Lawsuit Signals Focus on Enforcement at Obama
EPA, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2095 (Sept. 11, 2009).
514. Wayne Barber, EPA Sues NRG Energy over Operation of Big Cajun 2 Plant, SNL ELEC.
UTIL. REP., March 2, 2009; Duncan, supra note 509.
515. Steven D. Cook, Utility Settles New Source Review Charges by Retiring Coal-Fired Power
Plant in Ohio, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1117 (May 21, 2010).
516. Michael Bologna, Government Brings Clean Air Act Charges Against Midwest Generation
in Illinois Case, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2094 (Sept. 11, 2009); Childers, supra note 513.
517. Jennifer Zajac, DTE Energy Calls EPA Lawsuit over Monroe Plant Modifications “Absurd,” SNL DAILY COAL REP., Aug. 11, 2010.
518. Robert C. Cook, Court Finds No New Source Review Violation in Detroit Edison’s Renovation of Steam Unit, 42 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1969 (Sept. 9, 2011); Bob Matyi, DTE Energy Prevails
in Federal Government Lawsuit over Michigan’s Largest Power Plant, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Sept. 19,
2011.
519. Ameren Missouri Defends Itself Against Alleged New Source Review Violations, U.S. COAL
REV., Jan. 17, 2011.
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the lawsuits and were therefore barred by the general five-year statute
520
of limitations.
The new enforcement initiative included a major effort to settle
pending cases. According to the Government Accountability Office,
between January 2009 and December 2011, DOJ/EPA settled seven
cases against public utility companies and TVA in which the
companies agreed to pay $21.5 million in fines, spend $395 million
on supplemental environmental projects, spend $5.6 billion on
pollution control equipment at eighty-six units with a predicted
reduction in SO2 emissions of 445,684 tons per year and in NOx
521
By far the largest of these
emissions of 160,582 tons per year.
settlements was with one of the original nine defendants, TVA, which
agreed to pay $10 million in civil penalties, invest $350 million in
supplemental environmental projects, and spend up to $5 billion on
new controls at fifty-nine units that would reduce SO2 emissions by
225,757 tons per year and NOx emissions by almost 116,000 tons per
522
year. In July 2012, after GAO had tabulated the figures summarized
above, DOJ/EPA entered into a settlement with Dairyland Power
Cooperative, a small Wisconsin utility company, in which it agreed to
pay a fine of $950,000, pay for supplemental environmental projects
worth $5 million, and spend $150 million on pollution controls
predicted to reduce total emissions by more than 29,000 tons per
523
year.
As part of the National Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, EPA
issued another round of information requests and began issuing
notices of violation to electric utility companies, some of which
resulted in settlements in which sources agreed to install state-of-the524
When one company
art pollution controls or to retire old units.
520. See, e.g., Matthew Bandyk, Federal Court Again Dismisses Most Claims Against Midwest
Generation, SNL GENERATION MARKETS WK., Mar. 29, 2011; Glen Boshart, 8th Circuit Rejects
Challenge to S.D. Coal Plant, Finding No Ongoing Obligations, SNL ELEC. UTIL. REP., Aug. 23,
2010; Jessica Coomes, Court Says Statute of Limitations Prevents EPA Claims over Power Plant
Modifications, 43 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 261 (Feb. 3, 2012).
521. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 30 app.III.
522. Id.; Andrew M. Ballard, TVA to Spend up to $ 5 Billion to Upgrade Pollution Controls at
Coal-Fired Power Plants, 42 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 789 (Apr. 15, 2011).
523. Dairyland Power Cooperative Reaches Agreement with EPA, Department of Justice, U.S.
COAL REV., July 9, 2012.
524. See, e.g., Matthew Bandyk, Portland General Electric Receives Notice of Violation from EPA
on Boardman Plant, SNL GENERATION MARKETS WK., Oct. 12, 2010 (describing the notice of
violation sent to Portland General Electric); Barry Cassell, EPA Targets 2 PPL Corp. Coal
Plants with NSR Actions, SNL COAL REP., May 11, 2009 (describing notices of violation EPA
sent to PPL Corp. regarding its Keystone plant); Andrew Childers, Hoosier Energy to Spend
up to $300 Million on Plant Upgrades to Resolve Air Allegations, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1687 (July 30, 2010) (describing the consent decree between Hoosier Energy and EPA).
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refused to comply with EPA’s request for information on its future
construction plans, EPA filed a lawsuit seeking a court order for the
525
Environmental groups were pleased to see that EPA
information.
was “trying to be more diligent about enforcing plants across the
526
country.”
Hoping to stimulate the government into greater action,
environmental groups and downwind states sent sixty-day notices of
intent to sue to several more power plants alleging that they had
527
In some of those cases, the strategy
violated the NSR regulations.
528
worked as EPA intervened and, as the statute provides, took over
control of the litigation. For example, the DOJ/EPA lawsuit against
Midwest Generation was filed less than a month after environmental
groups filed a sixty-day notice of intent to sue the plant for the same
529
violations. Noting that EPA and the company had been negotiating
for years, the head of one of the local groups observed that “[t]hey
were either going to give up on negotiations and file suit, or they were
going to continue to negotiate and let a ragtag group of environment
530
and health organizations actually enforce the law.”
VI. DETERRENCE VERSUS ASSISTANCE AS VEHICLES FOR ADVANCING
STATUTORY GOALS
The federal government’s multi-year NSR enforcement initiative
generated a great deal of controversy over whether a deterrencebased approach was the most effective way to incentivize owners of
grandfathered power plants to clean up or retire their most polluting
units. The debate over EPA’s NSR initiative is part of a larger debate
over the efficacy of deterrence versus assistance as a tool for
implementing environmental policy. Drawing on the DOJ/EPA case
study, this Part examines this broader question. The lessons drawn
from this analysis should be applicable in other contexts in which an
525. Andrew Childers, EPA Seeking More Power Plant Closures, Information in New Source
Review Cases, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2731 (Dec. 10, 2010).
526. Bandyk, supra note 524 (quoting Cesia Kearns, Sierra Club).
527. See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Groups Threaten to Sue State Line Energy, Dominion over Air
Act Violations in Indiana, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2056 (Sept. 17, 2010); Matthew Bandyk, New
York, Pennsylvania to Sue Homer City Coal Plant over Emissions, SNL GENERATION MARKETS
WK., July 27, 2010; Susanne Pagano, Environmental Groups Sue Texas Utility over Pollution from
Coal-Fired Power Plant, 42 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 479 (March 11, 2011).
528. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
529. Michael Bologna, Government Brings Clean Air Act Charges Against Midwest Generation
in Illinois Case, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2094 (Sept. 11, 2009).
530. Id. (quoting Brian Urbaszewski, Director, Environmental Health Programs, Respiratory Health Association of Metropolitan Chicago).
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agency has a choice between deterrence and assistance in crafting
regulatory policy. This Part should also shed light on the less
analyzed issue of the weight that agencies should give to ongoing
enforcement efforts when they are contemplating reducing the
stringency of the rules that are at the heart of the ongoing litigation.
Evaluating the impacts of the DOJ/EPA enforcement initiative
(or any enforcement effort, for that matter) is not a straightforward
exercise. Many different programs that EPA administers under the
Clean Air Act affect power plant emissions, and it can be difficult to
disaggregate the effects of one program from those of other
531
programs. For example, it may be difficult to distinguish the impact
of CAIR, which the D.C. Circuit set aside but left in place on an
532
interim basis, from the impact of the DOJ/EPA NSR initiative. As we
have seen, Bush administration officials belittled the NSR
enforcement initiative because it did not compare favorably with
533
CAIR or the Clear Skies legislation in terms of pollution reduction.
As it turned out, however, the comparison was illusory because
534
neither of those alternatives became law.
To some extent, the debate over the DOJ/EPA enforcement
initiative has been a debate over EPA’s aggressive interpretation of
the word “modification” in the Clean Air Act, its narrow
interpretation of the RMRR exemption in its NSR regulations, and
the overall desirability of any NSR program. Although the purpose of
this Article is not to defend the concept of NSR and EPA’s
interpretations of its statute and regulations, to the extent that
substantive criticisms and defenses of the NSR program bleed into
arguments about the desirability of the EPA/DOJ enforcement
initiative as a vehicle for implementing that program, the Article will
address them as well.
The most carefully designed regulatory program imaginable will
have no impact on environmental quality if the sources to which the
program applies may ignore its requirements with impunity. EPA has
frequently stressed that “an effective federal enforcement and
compliance assurance program is an indispensable element of the
531. See PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 19–21 (describing alternative means of
reducing emissions under the Clean Air Act).
532. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (setting aside CAIR); North
Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that vacatur of CAIR was not required prior to EPA’s promulgation of a revised rule).
533. See supra text accompanying note 348.
534. North Carolina, 531 F.3d 896 (setting aside CAIR); Mary Curtius & Tom Hamburger, Bush’s Clear Skies Act Stalls in the Senate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A12 (reporting on
the failure of the Clear Skies Act).
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535

national environmental protection system.”
The theory of
deterrence-based enforcement is based on the common sense
premise that corporations are rational economic actors seeking to
maximize profits and will therefore behave lawfully when the costs of
536
The effectiveness of a
noncompliance outweigh the benefits.
sanction is a function of both the size of the penalty and the
probability that the government will identify and prosecute violative
537
conduct.
A. Specific Deterrence
One uncontroversial advantage of strict deterrence-based
enforcement is that “it convinces the violator not to violate again,” a
538
Specific deterrence
phenomenon known as “specific deterrence.”
speaks loudly and directly to flouters. Once a flouter has been caught
and punished, the flouter should be less likely to flout again. Flouters
who have no respect for the regulatory requirements may respect the
power of the Department of Justice to drag them into court and to
539
The extent
force them to pay stiff penalties for unlawful conduct.
to which the specific deterrence advantage of deterrence-based
enforcement is realized in any given regulatory setting depends on
the probability and the consequences of getting caught. A slap on the
wrist may not discourage recidivism, especially if the likelihood of
getting caught is low.
B. General Deterrence
A second great advantage of strict enforcement is the message
that it sends to other companies that they also risk punishment if they
540
violate the law. No matter how sensible the rule and no matter how
persuasive the relevant regulatory agency is in explaining the need for
compliance, the power of the government to punish errant conduct
gives the agency a credibility that allows it to focus the attention of the

535. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF EPA’S ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE
MEASURES STRATEGY 1 (1997).
536. Rechtschaffen, supra note 8.
537. EPA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 2–3.
538. Markell, supra note 11, at 11.
539. See Barcott, supra note 166 (“Having long flouted the new-source review law, many
of the nation’s biggest power companies were facing, in the last months of the 1990’s, an
expensive day of reckoning. E.P.A. investigators had caught them breaking the law.”).
540. Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Enviromental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation Capture,
and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 96 (2002).
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541

regulated entities on their responsibilities to others.
This “general
deterrence” function of strict enforcement depends upon the
perception of members of the regulated community that sanctions
542
will be swiftly implemented in a consistent fashion.
Minimal compliers carefully weigh the cost of compliance against
the magnitude of the relief that the government is likely to seek
discounted by the probability that the violation will be detected and
prosecuted. Strict deterrence-based enforcement increases both the
magnitude of the probable penalty and the likelihood that the
violation will be prosecuted, thereby sending to minimal compliers
the message that they should not press the envelope of compliance.
Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that deterrence-based
enforcement is effective in achieving compliance with regulatory
requirements and that “lack of meaningful sanctions has a significant
543
The approach appeared to
adverse effect on compliance rates.”
work in the case of the DOJ/EPA NSR enforcement initiative. EPA’s
Office of Inspector General concluded in 2004 that the initiative was
an effective way to ensure that utility companies installed pollution
544
control devices when they were making other modifications.
C. Effective Implementation
If the assumption that minimal compliers and flouters make up a
substantial percentage of regulated industry is accurate, then strict
deterrence-based enforcement may be the best way to ensure that the
policies underlying the relevant statute are implemented. The Clean
Air Act’s NSR program, for example, was the result of a grand
legislative compromise under which existing sources were not subject
to federally mandated pollution reduction technologies until they
545
Without strict federal
undertook significant modifications.
enforcement of standards broadly defining “modification” and
narrowly defining the RMRR exemptions, flouters and minimal

541. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TO PUNISH OR PERSUADE 118 (1985) (noting that “[t]he power to punish helps give legitimacy to regulators who wish to persuade”).
542. EPA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 2–3.
543. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,815–18 (summarizing existing studies); see
also Andreen, supra note 89, at 76 (“Breakdowns in federal enforcement seriously undercut
law enforcement efforts, . . . encourage non-compliance, and subject the EPA to ridicule.”); James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends and Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 46 (2003) (citing studies conducted by EPA).
544. OIG, NSR REPORT, supra note 396, at i.
545. Senate Public Health Hearings, supra note 229, at 47 (statement of Gregory Wetstone,
NRDC).
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compliers will avoid NSR, thereby undermining the protective policies
underlying the grand compromise.
D. Affirming Moral Values
There is also a moral dimension to deterrence-based
enforcement that emphasizes the importance of punishing companies
546
Connecticut
that have been getting away with unlawful conduct.
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal called the defendants in the
NSR litigation “brazen, blatant environmental outlaws” who deserved
to be punished, not freed of their responsibilities by the assistance547
Strict deterrence-based
based policies of the Bush administration.
enforcement has the potential to “shore up the moral authority of the
548
Compromise,
regulatory rule and the enforcement agency.”
conciliation, and promises to do better in the future in lieu of
punishment “may delegitimize the rule violated and actually encourage
549
noncompliance by others who would otherwise comply voluntarily.”
The closed door negotiations that frequently characterize assistancebased approaches to enforcement fail to convey the important
message to the regulated community that violating regulations
550
designed to protect citizens is not just inefficient, it is wrong.
E. Level Playing Fields
Strict deterrence-based enforcement levels the playing field for
maximal compliers who err on the side of compliance with the
551
environmental laws. To the extent that they get away with conduct
that violates the law, flouters and minimal compliers obtain a
competitive advantage over maximal compliers that can be reflected
552
This competitive
in the prices of their competing products.
advantage is especially clear in the case of NSR where owners of older
units cross over the line of illegality to avoid installing expensive
pollution controls that maximal compliers and owners of new sources
will have to install. Although they compete in the same deregulated
546. Goodell, supra note 219.
547. Shogren, Decision Near, supra note 90.
548. Zinn, supra note 540, at 97.
549. Id. at 97–98.
550. Id. at 98.
551. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 97 (statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Environment and Natural Resources Division, DOJ) (“[A]n important
component of our efforts [is] to discourage non-compliance and to ensure a level playing
field between those who comply with the law and those who fail to do so.”).
552. Markell, supra note 11, at 11; EPA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 1–4.
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market for electricity, flouters and minimal compliers can produce
electricity at lower cost than maximal compliers because they do not
invest in pollution reduction technology.
F. Uncovering Information
The lawsuits that characterize deterrence-based enforcement
allow plaintiffs to uncover information that would otherwise remain
buried in industry files. For example, discovery in the NSR litigation
turned up several “smoking gun” documents revealing that the
electric utility industry, despite its protestations to the contrary, had
known that projects causing large increases in emissions should have
553
Other documents discovered in the litigation
triggered NSR.
showed that the Electric Power Research Institute had advised its
members to identify life extension projects as “upgraded maintenance
programs” and to “downplay the life extension aspects of these
projects (and extended retirement dates) by referring to them as
554
plant restoration . . . projects.”
G. Innovative Remedies
One very attractive attribute of strict deterrence-based
enforcement is the wide and flexible variety of remedies that are
available through judicial orders and consent decrees. In addition to
substantial monetary penalties of up to $27,500 per day, a court in a
Clean Air Act case can mandate the installation of the state-of-the-art
technologies that the company should have installed at the time of
555
Judicial injunctions or consent decrees can also
the change.
require sources to fund “supplemental projects,” like installing
additional pollution controls on municipal trucks and municipal
wastewater facilities or specific actions to protect watersheds and
forests in national parks, which are important to the surrounding
556
communities.

553. McIntosh, supra note 410.
554. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at 100 (statement of David Hawkins,
NRDC).
555. PARKER & BLODGETT, supra note 55, at 8.
556. See, e.g., Cook, AEP Settles, supra note 485; Steven D. Cook, Valero Energy Agrees to
Spend $232 Million on New Controls, Pay $4.25 Million Penalty, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1805
(Aug. 24, 2007). With its share of the fines from the massive American Electric Power settlement, the State of New York paid for a $1.9 million energy efficiency program for lowincome families that saved them money and reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Lawsuit
Funds N.Y. Energy Program, INSIDE ENERGY WITH FED. LANDS, Nov. 17, 2008, at 17.
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H. Political Influence
Like the legislative process, the rulemaking process is vulnerable
to political influence. Lobbyists for affected interest groups press
their cases in private meetings with agency staff, high-level agency
political appointees, officials in the Office of Management and
Budget, White House staffers, and members of important
congressional committees. In high-stakes rulemaking, companies may
take their cases to the general public through staged media events,
advertisements, websites, and appeals by industry-funded “Astroturf”
557
These efforts can easily shape the
public interest groups.
substantive outcome of rulemaking initiatives, especially when the
motivation behind the rulemaking exercise is to assist the regulated
industry. For example, Connecticut Attorney General Blumenthal
attributed EPA’s 2002 decision to finalize the 1996 NSR Simplification
rulemaking and to initiate the Safe Harbor Rule to political pressure
558
from the energy industry through the Cheney Energy Task Force.
While deterrence-based approaches are not immune to political
influence, they are considerably less vulnerable to political overtures
than assistance-based rulemaking. Media reports of strict deterrencebased enforcement actions against politically powerful companies
contribute to a public sense that wrongdoers are being held
accountable for their unlawful activities and thereby enhance public
559
By contrast, the spectacle of an
trust in the regulatory regime.
agency restraining enforcers or rewriting the rules to shield
companies from enforcement actions of past violations of the law can
destroy public faith in government, especially when it appears that
560
For this reason, internal
violations are widespread and flagrant.
White House rules “typically prohibit White House staffers from
contacting agencies about specific enforcement actions, without
561
Even
preclearance from the White House counsel’s office.”

557. Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1708–09 (2012). An Astoturf campaign “is a fake grassroots
movement.” George Monbiot, The Tea Party Movement: Deluded and Inspired by Billionaires,
GUARDIAN, Oct. 25, 2010, at A31.
558. See Martha Kessler, Utility Groups, State Officials Disagree on Enforcement of Program by
Agency, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1401 (July 20, 2001) (“The nation’s biggest air polluters
would have the Bush administration pull the rug out from under efforts to clean up some
of the most out-dated and polluting power plants in the country.” (quoting Rob Sargent,
MASSPIRG)).
559. Markell, supra note 11, at 11.
560. Andreen, supra note 89, at 76.
561. Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 NYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 32).

2013]

NEW SOURCE REVIEW ENFORCEMENT

1281

committed industry friends like Senators John Breaux (R-Louisiana)
and James Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) were careful to deny that they were
attempting to “tell EPA not to enforce the law” even as they were
urging the Cheney Task Force to suspend all of the NSR prosecutions
pending an investigation into the legitimacy of the government’s
562
position in those lawsuits.
I. The Case for Assistance
Underlying assistance-based approaches to regulation is the
assumption that most regulatees are maximal compliers who are
motivated by civic responsibilities beyond the simple maximization of
profits. Because their employees and the compliance consultants that
they hire are professionals, regulatory agencies can trust companies to
act lawfully to the extent that those professionals are able to ascertain
the correct path from the complex, vague, and sometimes conflicting
563
The government
regulations that the agency has promulgated.
should therefore treat regulatees as partners in the common pursuit
564
Proponents of
of the agreed-upon goal of maximum compliance.
assistance-based approaches predict that educational programs,
technical assistance, and subsidies will yield greater environmental
improvement than “bean counting” exercises involving numbers of
565
citations issued and amounts of fines assessed.
1. Nonadversarial Relationships
The primary disadvantage of deterrence-based regulation is its
strong tendency to push the regulator and the regulatee into an
adversarial relationship. Proponents of assistance-based approaches
argue that minimal compliers are far more likely to engage in
contentious disputes over interpretations of vague requirements,
rather than compromise in an effort to achieve a beneficial
environmental outcome, when the government insists on strict
enforcement of its interpretation of the relevant statutes and
566
Supporters of assistance-based approaches view
regulations.
567
Instead of filing deterrencepunishment as a legalistic last resort.
based lawsuits, the agency should attempt to build a foundation of
562. Najor, Suspend NSR Enforcement, supra note 306.
563. Peter J. May, Regulatory Regimes and Accountability, 1 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 8,
12 (2007).
564. Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,804.
565. Markell, supra note 11, at 8.
566. Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,804.
567. Markell, supra note 11, at 4.
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mutual trust and respect to support cooperative efforts to come up
with innovative and flexible solutions when differences in
568
Government officials can make compliance
interpretation arise.
more palatable by demonstrating that compliance will produce
measurable environmental improvements, by praising responsible
companies in public forums, and by helping regulatees to identify and
implement feasible compliance options (for example, through
569
Assistance-based tools like tollcreative financing arrangements).
free “hotlines,” workshops and conferences, newsletters, and onsite
visits will yield better results more quickly than seeking large fines in
570
contentious enforcement litigation.
Supporters of deterrence-based approaches respond that it is
surprisingly naïve to believe that most corporations are maximal
571
While
compliers who are anxious to comply with the law.
cooperation between agency investigators and regulatees is an
altogether laudable goal, corporations face strong incentives to violate
572
When the government resorts to persuasion instead of
the laws.
deterrence, it is effectively conceding that the relevant rules are soft
573
Flouters will ignore regulatory requirements until
and negotiable.
they are caught, and minimal compliers will interpret the
requirements narrowly and the exemptions broadly to avoid spending
scarce resources on controls that will not increase corporate profits.
Civic responsibility may inspire some companies to become maximal
compliers for some of the time, but shareholder demands for greater
returns on their investments will ensure that most companies will
574
Supporters of deterrence-based
remain minimal compliers.
enforcement are skeptical of the ability of professionals within
corporations or in company-hired consulting companies to ensure
that companies comply with the rules. They are cynical enough to
believe that the one who pays the piper calls the tune. They worry
that even professional organizations can become captured by the
575
companies that hire their members.

568. Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,804.
569. EPA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 5–3 to 5–5.
570. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDE FOR MEASURING COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE
OUTCOMES 4 (1999) (listing tools).
571. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 541, at 100.
572. Id.; Peter Mascini, The Blameworthiness of Health and Safety Rule Violations, 27 LAW &
POL’Y 472, 479–80 (2005); Zinn, supra note 540, at 89, 96.
573. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 541, at 112.
574. RENA I. STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM 90 (2008).
575. May, supra note 563, at 23.
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The experience of the electric power industry during the years
between the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, which created NSR,
and the Clinton administration’s NSR enforcement initiative in 1999
bears this assessment out. As we have seen, documents and analyses
presented to the courts in the NSR enforcement litigation
demonstrated that while EPA was adhering to the compliance
assistance approach during the early years of NSR, owners of power
plants were spending millions of dollars on projects that increased
576
emissions and did not come within the RMRR exemption.
2. Fewer Resources
Another convincing argument in favor of the assistance-based
approach is that it consumes fewer agency resources than strict
577
As a practical matter, “the capacity of
deterrence-based programs.
company lawyers to exploit the complexity of the law and assert every
legal right of their clients” means that full-scale prosecution “becomes
578
NSR enforcement cases, for
very expensive and time-consuming.”
example, require investigators to review a huge volume of records on
capital and maintenance expenditures over the life of every unit at
the target facility, to analyze reams of historical data on the plant’s
emissions, and to respond to document demands and other discovery
579
The DOJ/EPA NSR enforcement
requests from the defendants.
initiative consumed a large proportion of OECA’s dwindling
enforcement resources, and it consumed the time of about one-third
of the attorneys in the Justice Department’s environmental
580
The twenty-two settlements that resulted
enforcement division.
from the initiative as of mid-2012 took an average of seven years to
581
complete.

576. See supra Parts II–IV.
577. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 541, at 109; GRAHAM K. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF SAFETY
AND HEALTH 11 (1985); Markell, supra note 11, at 4.
578. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 541, at 110.
579. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 17; see also Senate NSR Policy Hearings,
supra note 75, at 113 (statement of Jeffrey Holmstead, EPA) (stating that “the filing of the
power plant suits in 1999 was the culmination of 2 years of effort by dozens of EPA Headquarters and Regional personnel, who investigated and developed the cases”).
580. See GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 19 (EPA resources); OIG, NSR
REPORT, supra note 396, at 22–23 (OECA (EPA) resources); Steve Cook, Enforcement Cases
Against Power Companies Move Slowly, Assistant Attorney General Says, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA)
110 (Jan. 21, 2005) (DOJ resources).
581. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 19
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3. Fewer Delays
In addition to consuming many resources, the process of
building and prosecuting consumes a great deal of time. 582 Referring
to the ongoing NSR litigation, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson
complained that “[n]o one’s air gets any cleaner when you’re sitting
583
Likewise, the head of DOJ’s environmental
in a courtroom.”
enforcement unit characterized the NSR litigation as “a slow boat to
584
Compliance assistance, by contrast, can proceed quite
China.”
expeditiously at the ground level as the agency and the regulatee
cooperatively search for the most efficient way to comply with the
relevant requirements. Promulgating clarifying regulations can
achieve compliance more rapidly than lawsuits that may wend their
way through the courts for years before regulatees obtain a definitive
interpretation of ambiguous regulatory language. The Duke Energy
case, for example, went on for six-and-a-half years before public utility
companies knew for certain that yearly, not hourly emissions were the
relevant measure for determining whether projects crossed the NSR
585
significance thresholds.
4. Encouraging Maximal Compliance
Supporters of assistance-based approaches believe that the
“iterative process” of negotiation, mediation, technical assistance,
bargaining and compromise is the most effective way to ensure
compliance with comprehensive and sometimes cross-cutting
586
The negotiations offer government
regulatory requirements.
enforcers an opportunity to “mitigate the perceived irrationality and
unfairness of generally applicable regulations” promulgated by
agencies that could not possibly have anticipated every regulatee’s

582. Eric Pianin, U.S. Presses Utilities on Pollution Settlements, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2002,
at A5 (citing statements made by EPA Administrator, Christie Todd Whitman, at a Senate
hearing).
583. Brian Hansen, Familiar Arguments Divide Sides as EPA Pitches 3rd New Source Review
Change, INSIDE ENERGY WITH FED. LANDS, Oct. 17, 2005, at 3.
584. Steve Cook, Enforcement Cases Against Power Companies Move Slowly, Assistant Attorney
General Says, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 110 (Jan. 21, 2005) (quoting Thomas Sansonetti, Assistant Att’y Gen. for Environment and Natural Resources, DOJ); see also id. (characterizing
NSR litigation as “a quagmire that will not be resolved soon” (quoting Robert Sussman,
attorney, Latham and Watkins)).
585. See Stam, Duke Energy Case, supra note 216 (providing an overview of the highlights
of the Duke Energy lawsuit). The government filed the Duke Energy case in December 2000,
and the Supreme Court decided the appeal in April 2007. Id.
586. Zinn, supra note 540, at 89.
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587

unique situation.
During the negotiations, companies are more
likely to accept advice from inspectors on protective steps that may be
taken beyond those strictly required by the written rules, including
588
developing and implementing new safety technologies. If treated as
adversaries, however, they “will become resentful and less
cooperative” minimal compliers, doing only what is absolutely
589
required and no more.
5. Reducing Unnecessary Burdens
When an agency makes law on a case-by-case basis by applying
broadly articulated factors to the facts before it in an enforcement
action, it is hard for a company to know in advance how the agency
will come out with respect to a particular project to which the
company may need to devote millions of dollars and much staff
590
This is especially true in the case of exemptions like the
time.
591
Deterrence-based enforcement places a great
RMRR exclusions.
burden on companies to anticipate in advance how the agency will
592
In
react to their actions long after it is possible to reverse them.
addition to fostering uncertainty, enforcement litigation is
economically burdensome to defendants who must hire lawyers,
comply with broad discovery requests, and engage in public relations
593
efforts to burnish their public images.
Supporters of deterrence-based approaches respond that
uncertainties can usually be reduced a considerable degree by
consulting agency guidance documents and by consulting with agency
officials in advance of making heavy investments. For example,
companies concerned about whether a project will subject a source to
NSR can ask EPA for an applicability determination prior to initiating
594
The argument that litigation subjects companies to
a project.
587. Id. at 99.
588. GRAHAM K. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF SAFETY AND HEALTH: OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (Oxford University Press 1985); Zinn, supra
note 540, at 100–01.
589. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 8, at 10,804 (describing the position of advocates of
cooperative approaches).
590. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at 87 (statement of Bob Slaughter, National Petrochemical and Refiners Association); Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 9.
591. Aw-yang, supra note 100, at 337.
592. Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 221.
593. See CHARLI E. COON, HERITAGE FOUND., TIME FOR EPA TO REEVALUATE ITS
REINTERPRETATION OF NEW SOURCE REVIEW RULES (Nov. 19, 2001), available at
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/11/time-for-epa-to-reevaluate-itsreinterpretation; GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 19.
594. See supra text accompanying note 162.
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burdensome discovery requests presumes that the companies are in
fact innocent. The information that the litigation turned up in the
NSR enforcement litigation, however, demonstrated that most of the
defendants were far from innocent victims of arbitrary government
attacks. They had known for years that the expensive life extension
projects they had undertaken were subject to NSR and did not come
595
within any reasonable interpretation of the RMRR exemption. To a
large extent, then, the burdens of litigation were self-imposed.
The critics of the DOJ/EPA deterrence-based enforcement
initiative raised a number of concerns specific to that litigation to
bolster their argument that EPA should rely more heavily on
assistance-based measures. First, they argued that EPA should have
solicited public comment on its broad interpretation of
“modification” and narrow interpretation of the RMRR exemption in
596
In a collateral
a full-fledged notice-and-comment rulemaking.
attack on the enforcement actions, a group of nonutility companies
calling itself the Coalition for Responsible Regulations filed a separate
action in the D.C. Circuit challenging the NSR enforcement initiative
597
as a transparent attempt to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking.
EPA enforcers responded that the agency had already promulgated a
set of rules, and the projects that it was pursuing in the litigation
598
clearly violated those existing rules. The industry’s notice concerns
were misplaced because each defendant had a full opportunity to
respond to the agency’s interpretations of the regulations in the
judicial hearings. In any event, NSR enforcement actions were
unsuited to rulemaking because the relevant facts varied from case to
case, and the issues were therefore more appropriately addressed in
599
individual adjudications.

595. See supra text accompanying notes 189–190.
596. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at 88 (statement of Bob Slaughter, National Petrochemical and Refiners Association); Armstrong, supra note 194, at 204; Eder &
Juni, supra note 194, at 9; see also Domike & Zacaroli, supra note 221 (explaining that
“[o]ne of the most troubling aspects of EPA’s recent NSR activity is the agency’s attempt to
rewrite the rules governing NSR permitting through the enforcement context” rather than
through formal rulemaking).
597. See Pamela Najor, Petition to Review Agency Enforcement Voluntarily Withdrawn by Industry Coalition, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 226 (Feb. 11, 2000) (reporting that the Coalition
asked the court to dismiss its challenge after receiving assurance from EPA that member of
the coalition were not under investigation).
598. See Pamela Najor, Enforcement Against Utilities Seen as Shift Away from Rules to Achieve
Pollution Cuts, 31 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 278 (Feb. 18, 2000) (“‘There is enough low-hanging
fruit’ with violations of existing regulations to keep the office occupied . . . .” (quoting
Bruce Buckheit, EPA)).
599. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 22.
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Second, the industry and upwind states argued that the litigation
was adversely affecting state regulatory programs. In many cases, state
permitting authorities had issued NSR “nonapplicability”
determinations concluding that specific projects were within the
600
Second-guessing state agency decisions with
RMRR exemption.
federal enforcement actions, they argued, was inconsistent with the
Clean Air Act’s clear preference for allowing states to function
601
Furthermore, if
autonomously within the confines of their SIPs.
EPA’s narrow view of the RMRR exemption were correct, overworked
state agencies would be deluged with thousands of additional requests
602
EPA responded that it simply
for nonapplicability determinations.
could not trust state agencies in some upwind states to apply the NSR
regulations stringently against local plants to protect air quality in
603
Since the NSR regulations did not require
downwind states.
companies to report projects that, in their estimation, did not cross
the significance thresholds or that came within the RMRR
exemptions, state agencies would not necessarily even be aware of
604
projects that violated the regulations.
Third, the critics argued that the litigation was discouraging
efficiency-enhancing repairs and improvements that were necessary to
605
In the long
protect worker safety and expand generating capacity.

600. Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 10.
601. Id. at 9–11; see also Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at 66 (statement of
Bill Pryor, Att’y Gen., Alabama) (“EPA’s course eviscerated the cooperative federalist approach that is the heart of Congress’ design.”); Kessler, supra note 558 (“‘The EPA should
allow states having effective minor NSR programs more flexibility in determining how federal requirements will be met.’” (quoting Dale Beebe-Farrow, Assistant Director, Air Permits Division, Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission)).
602. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at 87 (statement of Bob Slaughter, National Petrochemical and Refiners Association).
603. Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 10. The agency’s inspector general cited several
instances of upwind state agency failures to report significant violations of the NSR regulations to EPA. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT NO. E1GAE7-030045-8100244, CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON OECA’S OVERSIGHT OF REGIONAL AND STATE
AIR ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS 7–14 (1998).
604. See New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing the lack of reporting requirements).
605. See Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 26 (statement of Ande Abbott, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers) (addressing worker safety); EPA NSR REPORT,
supra note 246, at 14 (“[A] significant number of industry commenters stated that an inappropriately narrow routine maintenance, repair and replacement exclusion would prevent electricity generators from taking advantage of opportunities to improve their generating efficiency.”); Kessler, supra note 558 (referencing statements made by C. Boyden
Gray of the Electricity Reliability Coordinating Council that EPA’s enforcement program
“is discouraging efficiency improvements and cutting the potential for expanding generating capacity”).

1288

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1204

run, this would threaten the reliability of the nation’s electricity
606
grids. It would also have the perverse effect of discouraging power
plants from undertaking projects that would enhance environmental
607
Supporters of the initiative
quality by increasing efficiency.
responded that strict deterrence-based enforcement of NSR would
not discourage efficiency improvement projects that did not result in
an increase in actual emissions, and assisting the industry by turning a
blind eye on projects that did increase emissions would run contrary
608
to the intent of the statute. According to EPA, the power plants that
609
Environmental
it had sued had not suffered any loss in capacity.
groups scoffed at the notion that assisting companies by facilitating
projects at existing plants would result in environmental
improvements, because the modest efficiency gains available through
tweaking existing plants would result in an equally modest reduction
in pollutants per kilowatt hour. The companies could achieve vastly
greater efficiency gains by replacing older units with much more
610
efficient (and less polluting) new units.
Fourth, critics of the NSR enforcement initiative argued that the
settlements required “little more, if anything, than what the settling
companies had already started doing for business and regulatory
611
In particular, while the litigation was pending, EPA had
reasons.”
promulgated CAIR, which would have established a cap-and-trade
612
High-level EPA
regime for power plans in twenty-eight states.
officials frequently cited CAIR in support of the agency’s attempts to
revise the NSR regulations, arguing that any emissions increases
brought about by the changes would be more than offset by emissions
606. Eder & Juni, supra note 194, at 11; Goodell, supra note 219; Marquis, supra note
325 (quoting Scott Segal, Bracewell & Guiliani); Shogren, Decision Near, supra note 90
(quoting Paul King, Vice President, Cinergy Power Generation).
607. See Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 93, at 90 (statement of W. Henson
Moore, President, American Forest & Paper Association); EPA NSR REPORT, supra note
246, at 15–16 (describing the industry argument that discouraging efficiency improvements results in higher emissions); Industry Calls on Senate to Support NSR Changes, OIL &
GAS J., Aug. 19, 2002; Matthew L. Wald, Cleaning Coal-Fired Plants: The Debate Burns on, N.Y
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at F1.
608. EPA NSR REPORT, supra note 246, at 16; Kessler, supra note 558 274 (quoting Lauren Liss, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and Peter Lehner, New
York Attorney General’s Office).
609. Senate NSR Policy Hearings, supra note 75, at 73 (statement of Eric Schaeffer, Environmental Integrity Project).
610. Buckheit Testimony, supra note 85, at 4.
611. Jaber, supra note 53, at 29.
612. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean
Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the the NOx SIP Call, 70
Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 72–74, 77–78, and 96).
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613

reductions attributable to CAIR.
In fact, the rule had little impact
on emissions from existing sources because it was set aside by the D.C.
Circuit, though the court allowed EPA to leave it in effect pending
614
remand.
J. Deterrence in Practice: A Very Successful NSR Enforcement Initiative
By virtually any measure, the DOJ/EPA NSR enforcement
initiative was a great success. Of the 831 electricity- generating units
that EPA investigated prior to 2012, it took some kind of enforcement
action against 467, representing about forty-five percent of the coal615
fired electricity generating units in the United States. The initiative
resulted in twenty-two major settlements covering 263 units, about
616
thirty-two percent of the 831 units. According to the calculations of
the Government Accountability Office, the companies that were
parties to the settlements agreed to spend around $12.8 billion on
617
pollution controls and pay around $80 million in fines. When fully
implemented, the settlements are estimated to reduce SO2 emissions
by more than 1.8 million tons per year and NOx emissions by more
618
An early analysis of EPA’s NSR
than 596,000 tons per year.
enforcement initiative prepared for the Clean Air Task Force in 2002
found that 5,500–9,000 deaths per year and 106,000–165,000 asthma
attacks were attributable to the fifty-one power plants that were the
619
subjects of the NSR lawsuits at that time. The study also determined

613. Steven D. Cook, Impact of Changes to Enforcement Program Offset by EPA’s Interstate
Rule, Report Says, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1555 (July 28, 2006) (quoting Bill Harnett, EPA);
Juliet Eilperin, EPA Issues Draft Rules on Plants’ Emissions, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2005, at A4
(quoting Stephen L. Johnson, EPA). EPA also took the position that CAIR encouraged
companies in lawsuits to come “to the table for settlement discussions.” Susan Bruninga,
Ohio Edison Co. Agrees to Pay $1.1 Billion to Cut Emissions 212,000 Tons from Plants, 36 ENV’T
REP. (BNA) 573 (Mar. 25, 2005) (quoting Thomas Skinner, EPA); Steve Cook, Illinois Power Agrees to Reduce Emissions in $500 Million Settlement of EPA Lawsuit, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA)
463 (Mar. 11, 2005) (quoting Thomas Skinner, EPA).
614. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (setting aside CAIR); North
Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (2008) (holding that vacatur of CAIR was not required prior to EPA’s promulgation of a revised rule).
615. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 20–21.
616. Id. at 21. The initiative resulted in 31 settlements with 108 refineries in 32 states
and territories representing more than 90% of the nation’s refining capacity in which
companies agreed to spend more than $6 billion on pollution controls. Lorraine McCarthy, Hess Corp. Agrees to Spend $45 Million on Advanced Pollution Controls at Refinery, 43 ENV’T
REP. (BNA) 1067 (Apr. 27, 2012).
617. GAO, BETTER INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 21.
618. Id.
619. L. BRUCE HILL, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS
AND COSTS OF CURRENT NEW SOURCE REVIEW LITIGATION 3 (2002).
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that 4,300–7,000 of those deaths and 80,000–120,000 of the asthma
620
attacks could be avoided if the plants were required to install BACT.
Cleaning up the plants to BACT levels would cost about $3.6 billion
621
per year and would yield health benefits of between $24–38 billion.
VII. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
The highly successful DOJ/EPA NSR enforcement initiative can
serve as a model for accomplishing major change through deterrencebased enforcement. In the late 1990s, at a time when political attacks
on EPA were at a low point and its administrator was determined to
bring about significant environmental improvement, the agency
devoted a substantial share of its enforcement resources to the NSR
622
It focused on the electric utility industry because
program.
preliminary investigations revealed that most of the companies were
minimal compliers and a few were flouters. The minimal compliers
had grown quite accustomed to their own narrow interpretations of
the word “modification” and expansive interpretations of the RMRR
exemption, in part because EPA had done little to prevent the steady
623
erosion of the meaning of its regulations.
When EPA finally did act, the industry cried foul, arguing that
the agency was attempting to foist off a radical new interpretation of
624
Unfortunately for the industry, the
its regulations on the courts.
courts did not accept its attempt to frame the issue, in part because a
wealth of documents turned up during discovery strongly suggested
that many companies knew full well that they were pressing the outer
edges of reasonable interpretation as they undertook expensive life625
extension projects without undergoing NSR. Although the political
dynamics of NSR shifted dramatically with the onset of the George W.
Bush administration as EPA’s air office proposed changes that would
have legalized much of the conduct that EPA enforcers had targeted,
DOJ and EPA persisted in their efforts to enforce the law that existed
626
The Obama administration
at the time of the violations.
reinvigorated the initiative in 2009 with positive results, indicating
620. Id.
621. Id. at 3–4. The report also concludes that “NSR enforcement holds significant
promise for reducing particulate matter, ozone, haze and acid rain where impacts are most
severe and emissions reductions will have the most benefit.” Id. at 4.
622. See supra Part II.A.
623. See supra Parts II.B, II.F.
624. See supra Part IV.C.
625. See supra text accompanying notes 189–190.
626. See supra Part V.H.

2013]

NEW SOURCE REVIEW ENFORCEMENT

1291

that many more companies had crossed the line between minimal
627
compliance and illegality.
In the end, the enforcement initiative yielded settlements with
virtually all of the targeted companies, which should bring about
628
major reductions in emissions of SO2 and NOx. The initiative went
on for more than a decade and it consumed many valuable resources,
but it ultimately accomplished more than the Clear Skies proposal,
which went nowhere in Congress, CAIR, which was overturned by the
D.C. Circuit, and all of the Bush administration’s proposed changes
to the NSR regulations, which, to the extent that they went into effect,
629
gave sources greater latitude to avoid NSR. Although the DOJ/EPA
initiative was clearly not favored by the Bush administration or by
Republican members of Congress, it moved inexorably forward in
neutral forums where the law, not political considerations,
determined the outcome.
One very powerful lesson that the NSR experience offers for the
future is that old-fashioned deterrence-based enforcement works.
The statistics on settlements lodged, pollution reduction promised,
penalties paid, and lives saved in the last Part demonstrate the
potential of a determined enforcement effort to accomplish genuine
630
It is possible, of course, that the NSR
environmental gains.
enforcement is sui generis: EPA enforcers encountered an industry
composed largely of flouters who had left behind an easily uncovered
paper trail and could not craft a credible legal strategy to explain its
unlawful conduct. That explanation, however, does not square with
the facts. While there were no doubt flouters in the industry, most of
the companies appeared to be aggressive minimal compliers who
were careful to stay within the bounds of a credible, if ultimately
unpersuasive, interpretation of the NSR regulations. More important,
the NSR initiative included more than one industry. For example,
many of the defendants were petroleum refineries and paper
companies that also entered into settlements that produced large
631
reductions in emissions.
A second lesson to take away from the NSR experience is that
strict enforcement is far less susceptible to political manipulation than
rulemaking. Once a lawsuit has been filed, the professional attorneys
in DOJ and EPA take over, and it becomes very difficult for even
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.

See supra Part V.H.5.
See supra Part VI.J.
See supra Parts V.E–F, VI.J.
See supra Part VI.J.
See supra note 483.
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powerful political actors such as Senator Inhofe and Vice President
632
Cheney to wrest control of the lawsuits away from the professionals.
Even a sustained effort by the Bush administration to change the
underlying rules in ways that undercut the enforcement effort failed
to cause the EPA and DOJ enforcers to back away from the pending
cases, though these efforts did periodically prevent EPA investigators
633
In the final analysis,
from pursuing new NSR enforcement cases.
accusations of political interference with DOJ efforts to bring
wrongdoers to justice are usually enough to cause politicians to back
off.
The third lesson of the NSR enforcement initiative is that strict
deterrence-based enforcement consumes large quantities of scarce
634
enforcement resources. In a time of governmental austerity, this is
an important impediment to deterrence-based enforcement programs
in the federal government. More than any other factor, the
availability of enforcement resources determines the probability that
violations will be detected and vigorously prosecuted. Yet, vigorous
enforcement will always be needed to bring flouters to justice and to
send a message to minimal compliers that they should think twice
about getting too close to the line between lawful and unlawful
635
Congress must therefore recognize its continuing
conduct.
responsibility to appropriate sufficient funds to EPA and DOJ for
them to undertake major enforcement initiatives in the future.
A fourth lesson is that agency attempts to amend the regulations
underlying an enforcement initiative to assist the relevant industry will
inevitably undermine that initiative, despite the agency’s protestations
636
In theory, a company is bound by the rules that
to the contrary.
were in effect at the time that it engaged in the allegedly unlawful
conduct, even if those rules are changed to legalize that particular
conduct in the future. Respect for the rule of law demands that
violators be punished for their actions, even if they successfully lobby

632. Cook, Lawsuits Going Ahead, supra note 318 (quoting Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal who described the professionals at DOJ and EPA as “‘emotionally
and professionally invested in this effort’”).
633. See supra Part V.H.
634. See supra Part VI.I.2.
635. See Senate Public Health Hearings, supra note 229, at 30 (statement of Christie Todd
Whitman, EPA) (“[T]here will always be companies against which we are going to need to
bring action . . . .”).
636. Steve Cook, Second Former EPA Enforcement Official Criticizes Bush Administration’s Reform Plan, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2297 (Oct. 25, 2002) (“‘Regulators trying to enforce the
Clean Air Act now do so on a shifting floor of promised exemptions and regulatory uncertainty . . . .’” (quoting Sylvia Lowrance, former deputy assistant administrator, EPA)).
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the agency to change the rules before the completion of the
enforcement actions.
In practice, however, the fact that the
government no longer thinks that the regulation is needed can have a
637
Judges may be less
profound effect on the ongoing litigation.
inclined to allow the cases to go forward when it is not clear that the
government believes that compliance will bring about needed
improvements, and they may be even less inclined to administer stiff
penalties to minimal compliers for conduct that pressed the outer
interpretational limits of regulations that are no longer applicable.
A fifth lesson is that citizen enforcement provisions in statutes
allow representatives of the beneficiaries of regulatory programs to
play a vital backup role in cases in which the federal government is
638
unwilling or unable to enforce the law. The purpose of the sixty-day
notice requirement is to allow the federal government to initiate and
control the course of the enforcement action before the citizens file
639
State attorneys general and environmental groups
their lawsuits.
can effectively force the federal government’s hand by filing a sixtyday notice and daring the government not to intervene. More
important, they can discourage DOJ from abandoning a lawsuit that it
has already filed by threatening to take over the litigation in the
government’s absence. After President Bush mandated a DOJ review
of the pending NSR litigation, for example, it was clear that Vice
President Cheney and Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham wanted
640
DOJ to drop some or all of those cases. The environmental groups
and state attorneys general who had intervened in those cases made it
clear, however, that they would press ahead with the cases if the
641
The net effect of the citizen
federal government withdrew.
enforcement provisions of the Clean Air Act was to act as an inertial
force against the government’s attempt to reverse course in the
middle of a major enforcement initiative.
The choice between deterrence-based approaches and assistancebased approaches is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Any particular
regulatory regime lies on a spectrum with strict deterrence at one
extreme and gratuitous assistance at the other. A regulatory regime

637. Devine, supra note 189, at 142–45; Mintz, supra note 36, at 10,503.
638. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 838 (1985);
May, supra note 563, at 8.
639. In fact, the mailing of a sixty-day notice letter is a legal prerequisite to filing any
action in court. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 638, at 869 n.89.
640. See supra Part V.B.
641. See supra Part V.H.4.
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can provide assistance to regulatees through guidance documents,
seminars, and training sessions and still be deterrence-based when the
agency makes it clear that it will vigorously prosecute flouters and
minimal compliers who go too far in exploiting gray areas. The
question for EPA and other regulatory agencies is where to locate
their programs on the spectrum.
In a society that prides itself on adherence to the rule of law, the
expectation is that most companies are maximal compliers who do
their best to ascertain and comply with the laws and regulations that
protect consumers, workers, and the environment from unacceptable
risks. The economics of compliance, however, ensure that companies
are more likely to be minimal compliers who are determined to divert
the fewest possible resources to compliance with regulations that do
not add to their bottom lines. And every regulatory regime will
encounter flouters who are happy to ignore legal restrictions until
they are caught. How the regulatory agency goes about enforcement
depends on its assessment of the proportions of its regulatees that fall
into each of these three categories. EPA’s experience with the
electric utility industry’s compliance with the Clean Air Act’s NSR
requirements suggests that when an agency encounters an industry
dominated by aggressive minimal compliers, a deterrence-based
strategy is likely to be more successful than an assistance-based
strategy that assumes that most regulatees happily obey that law.

